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Abstract in English 
The financial crisis has put systemic risk firmly on the policy agenda. In such a crisis, an initial 
shock gets amplified while it propagates to other financial intermediaries, ultimately disrupting 
the financial sector. We review the literature on such amplification mechanisms which create 
externalities from risk taking. We distinguish between two classes of mechanisms: contagion 
within the financial sector and pro-cyclical connection between the financial sector and the real 
economy. Regulation can diminish systemic risk by reducing these externalities. However, 
regulation of systemic risk faces several problems. First, systemic risk and its costs are difficult 
to quantify. Second, banks have strong incentives to evade regulation meant to reduce systemic 
risk. Third, regulators are prone to forbearance. Finally, the inability of governments to commit 
not to bail out systemic institutions creates moral hazard and reduces the market’s incentive to 
price systemic risk. Strengthening market discipline can play an important role in addressing 
these problems, because it reduces the scope for regulatory forbearance, does not rely on 
complex information requirements, and is difficult to manipulate. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Door de financiële crisis staat systeemrisico centraal op de beleidsagenda. Bij zo’n crisis 
verspreidt een schok zich naar andere financiële instellingen. De schok wordt daarbij versterkt, 
waardoor het financiële systeem in gevaar komt. We geven een overzicht van de literatuur over 
dergelijke versterkingsmechanismen die externaliteiten creëren van de risico’s die banken 
nemen. We onderscheiden twee typen mechanismen: besmetting binnen de financiële sector, en 
de procyclische connectie tussen de financiële sector en de reële economie. Regulering kan 
systeemrisico verminderen door externaliteiten in te perken. Hierbij spelen echter verschillende 
problemen. Ten eerste zijn systeemrisico en de kosten ervan moeilijk de kwantificeren. Ten 
tweede hebben banken prikkels om regulering van systeemrisico te ontduiken. Ten derde staan 
toezichthouders bloot aan de verleiding om te laat in te grijpen. Ten slotte kunnen overheden 
zich moeilijk eraan committeren om systeembanken niet te redden. Hierdoor hebben markten 
geen prikkel om systeemrisico te beprijzen. Het versterken van marktdiscipline kan helpen om 
deze problemen te verminderen, omdat het toezichthouders disciplineert, niet afhangt van 
complexe informatievereisten en moeilijk te manipuleren is. 
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Preface 
The financial crisis that engulfed the world in 2007-2008 started when the US housing market 
deteriorated. This relatively small shock spiralled out of control as problems propagated to other 
financial intermediaries and got amplified along the way. To prevent a total meltdown of the 
financial sector, governments had to step in with unprecedented support. These events have put 
systemic risk firmly on the policy agenda. 
The essence of systemic risk lies in the negative effects that one bank’s problems have on 
other banks. The mechanisms that lie behind these effects, however, are ill understood, 
empirically as well as theoretically. This document reviews the literature on systemic risk and 
identifies the generic problems faced by governments when trying to address systemic risk.  
We conclude that effective regulation should strengthen market discipline, reduce the scope 
for regulatory forbearance, not rely on complex information requirements, and be difficult to 
manipulate. A combination of prompt corrective action and systemic risk levies may be an 
effective way to achieve these goals. 
 
The authors thank Gijsbert Zwart (CPB), Paul de Bijl (CPB), Adam Elbourne (CPB), Wouter 
Elsenburg (CPB), Hans de Gryze (UvT), Wolf Wagner (UvT), Fabio Castiglionesi (UvT), Luc 
Laeven (IMF), Melle Bijlsma (DNB), Francis Weyzig (DNB) Marco Hengel (Fin), Raoul 
Leerling (EZ) and Arne Meeter (SZW) for their valuable comments. 
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Summary 
The recent – near catastrophic – events in the financial sector show that containing ‘systemic 
risk’ should lie at the root of the regulation of banks. It may therefore come as a surprise that, in 
spite of its relevance, no generally accepted definition of the term systemic risk exists. We 
argue that the difference between financial intermediaries and other firms should be at the core 
of a definition of systemic risk and provide a review and synthesis of the literature on systemic 
risk from this point of view.  
Systemic risk is the probability that a systemic crisis arises. A systemic crisis has three 
important characteristics: first an initial shock, second a propagation and amplification 
mechanism, and third disruption of the financial sector. It is generally accepted, although by no 
means trivial, that banks differ from other firms because of the existence of propagation and 
amplification mechanisms whereby one bank’s problems may propagate to other banks. If 
individual banks do not internalise the external effects of their own risk taking on other banks, 
they impose a negative externality on the financial system as a whole. As a consequence, from a 
social welfare point of view banks invest too little in reducing the probability or the effect of 
shocks, resulting in too much systemic risk. Because such a disruption of the financial sector is 
very costly for society, the existence of these externalities creates a rationale for government 
intervention and regulation of bank risk taking. 
This study focuses on the propagation and amplification mechanisms that create 
externalities from individual banks’ risk taking decisions. We identify two different channels 
through which externalities from risk taking may arise: first, contagion within the financial 
sector, and second, pro-cyclical connection between the financial sector and the real economy.  
Each channel has a number of amplification mechanisms that can play a role. Contagion within 
the financial sector arises through interconnectedness, reduced liquidity and information 
spillovers. The procyclical connection between the financial and the real sector arises from 
regulation, financial acceleration, and herding and asset-price bubbles. Figure 1.1 summarizes 
these channels and propagation mechanisms.   10 
















We define contagion as the propagation of shocks experienced by one bank to other banks 
through mechanisms within the financial sector. The literature identifies roughly three ways in 
which such propagation may arise. 
First, financial distress may spread through direct and indirect interconnections between 
banks, created by intricate web of financial contracts that connects financial intermediaries. 
Problems faced by one bank then lead to a loss for other banks. Such interconnections are 
ubiquitous in the financial sector. This distinguishes the financial sector from other industries 
where firms are generally not interconnected in this way. 
Direct contractual connections may for example be due to credit lines that facilitate the 
transfer of money from one bank to another, they may result from counter-party credit exposure 
on derivatives, or they may be caused by loans in the interbank market that allow banks to 
insure against liquidity shocks. Interdependencies can also be indirect, because of a common 
exposure to borrowers or lenders. 
Most of these exposures arise endogenously in response to the shocks to their liquidity 
needs that financial intermediaries experience. Such shocks occur for example because 
depositors withdraw funds, because borrowers default on their loans, because new investment 
opportunities arise, or because the value of banks’ assets decreases. Interconnections arise as a 
natural response to the opportunities for diversification and the need for insurance resulting 
from these shocks. The existence of interconnections does not immediately imply the existence 
of externalities, though. If banks price the risk of exposure into their contracts, then what may 
look like an externality ex post can simply be a correctly priced exposure to risk ex ante.   11 
Second, financial distress may spread if one bank’s problems negatively affect the ability of 
other banks to obtain funding when they unexpectedly need liquidity. Banks are vulnerable to 
such a ‘liquidity freeze’ because of the mismatch between long-term assets and short-term 
liabilities on their balance sheet. Liquidity freezes may result from fire sales, adverse selection, 
or liquidity hoarding. 
One way for banks to obtain liquidity is by selling assets. By definition, fire sales arise if 
selling assets reduces the market price of these assets. Fire sales arise naturally when holding 
liquid assets yields a lower return than investing them. Banks that hold excess liquid assets will 
then require a reward for doing so. The reward comes in times of distress when assets are sold 
to these banks at a discount, i.e., at fire sales prices. In that case, one bank’s decision to sell 
assets negatively affects other banks’ ability to obtain liquidity by selling assets. This creates a 
fire sale externality. 
Another potential explanation for liquidity freezes depends on the presence of asymmetric 
information. In the classic example, adverse selection arises if a potential buyer does not know 
whether he is dealing with a good car, or a bad car (a ‘lemon’). If a shock exacerbates or creates 
adverse selection, this may lead to a lemons problem, where buyers require a mark-up because 
they don’t know whether they are buying a good asset or a lemon. This leads to higher prices or 
even a total freeze of the market. Alternatively, shocks may increase lenders’ uncertainty on 
their own ability and that of other banks to assess whether they are dealing with a good or a bad 
borrower. Lenders are therefore subject to a winner’s curse, which may become unmanageable 
in bad times.  
Finally, a shock can lead to a liquidity freeze if it triggers liquidity hoarding. In that case, 
banks hold on to excess liquidity, because they expect fire sale prices to drop even further, or 
strategically withhold liquidity from banks in need, expecting that they will benefit if this 
weakens future competition.  
Third, shocks can also spread from bank to bank through informational spillovers. Bank 
runs can spread because a run on one bank implies information about other banks that allows 
rational agents to update their beliefs. For example, if the value of different banks’ assets is 
correlated, rational agents observing a bank run will conclude that other banks may also be in 
trouble. Alternatively, an unexpected bankruptcy can reveal information about the quality or 
intensity with which central banks or creditors monitor banks’ management. As a consequence, 
creditors may downgrade their assessments of other banks’ robustness. Also, when one bank is 
scrambling for cash and appears unable to obtain it, this may reveal the existence of an 
aggregate liquidity shortage. This may then cause other banks to start hoarding liquidity. 
Procyclicality 
Procyclicality refers to the feedback loop between the financial sector and the real economy. 
Several potential feedback mechanisms connect the financial sector and the real sector. These 
feedback mechanisms can strengthen a financial crisis once it gets going, making a crisis harder   12 
to contain. They work the opposite way in good times, causing banks to take on too much risk, 
for example by increasing leverage or the risk of their loan portfolio. 
First, regulation can drive procyclicality, thus enhancing the systemic externalities. Capital 
requirements are proportional to the risks on banks balance sheets. However, measurement 
difficulties often result in too low risk estimates in good times and too high-risk estimates in 
bad times. Procyclicality results if under- or overestimates are not corrected for. In addition, 
when regulation requires banks to hold a higher capital ratio during economic downswings, 
reflecting the increased potential credit losses in their portfolios, they may respond by reducing 
credit. This will reduce investment and consumption. Fair Value Accounting (FVA) can pose 
problems if assets’ market values no longer reflect fundamentals. Fair Value Accounting 
involves reporting assets and liabilities on the balance sheet at fair value and recognizing 
changes in fair value as gains and losses in the income statement. The main point is that market 
prices can deviate from fundamentals. This may happen, for example, when asset bubbles 
emerge, when markets freeze and become illiquid or when herding causes investors to neglect 
fundamentals. FVA then causes changes in these distorted prices to be reflected in banks’ 
balance sheets and profit and loss accounts. In a downturn: the immediate recording of fair 
value reduction on assets reduces banks’ capital base, hence their lending and their demand for 
securities.  
The second source of procyclicality is financial acceleration. The basic mechanism of 
financial acceleration is that during an economic contraction the value of available collateral 
and the level of pledgeable income decrease. This reduces firms’ ability to borrow and lowers 
investment. As a result, firms’ prospects are worsened, resulting in a downward spiral of lower 
assets prices, less borrowing and less investment.  
Regulation 
The benefits of creating systemic risk accrue privately, but the costs of a crisis are borne 
socially. This disparity makes regulation of systemic risk necessary. We divide policy measures 
that aim to reduce systemic risk into three broad categories: incentive regulation, structural 
regulation, and ex post crisis intervention.
1  
Incentive regulation tries to change the incentives of financial intermediaries so that they 
internalise the external effects of their risk taking. Ex ante price regulation, as it is sometimes 
referred to, can take the form of taxation, capital requirements, insurance. Policymakers can 
also change banks’ incentives by giving banks’ financiers stronger incentives to discipline 
banks, i.e., by increasing market discipline. 
Structural regulation tries to limit systemic risk through quantity regulation, such as putting 
quantitative restrictions on bank characteristics that are thought to be related to systemic risk or 
 
1 Other categorisations are of course also possible. Of course, a particular policy measures may belong to different 
categories, depending on its exact nature.  For example, measures that fall in the category ‘ex post crisis intervention’ often 
have ex ante effects. For expositional purposes, however, we put these policy measures in one category.   13 
limiting the activities that banks are allowed to perform, and structural measures, such as 
regulation rating agencies, increasing the transparency of markets, or reducing competition. 
Finally, ex post crisis intervention tries to dampen the mechanisms that spread problems 
once a crisis occurs. It includes the lender of last resort function of central banks, deposit 
insurance, bank-specific bankruptcy rules, contingency plans such as living wills, and prompt 
corrective action. Table 1.1 the policy measures and the issues involved in their 
implementation. 
Table 1.1  Policy measures to address systemic risk 
Type  Measure  Issues 
     
Incentive regulation  Taxation   Calibration, Politicians’ opportunism, industry lobbying     
  Capital requirements  Calibration, one instrument with too many goals, regulatory 
capture, limited scope   
  Insurance premium  Calibration, pricing incentives, payout trigger, moral hazard 
  Market discipline   Irrational market behaviour, implicit governments guarantees  
     
Structural regulation  Portfolio restrictions  Loss of economies of scope, gaming of regulation 
  Quantity regulation  Inefficiencies, triggers risk shifting  
  Product standardisation     Gaming of regulation, increased cost of tailored products  
  Increased transparency  Treatment of non-standard contracts, central counterparty risk,  
     
Ex post crisis intervention  Lender of last resort  Pricing of liquidity, distinguishing illiquidity from insolvency, 
moral hazard, regulatory forbearance  
  Deposit insurance  Pricing, moral hazard, implicit government guarantees, role of 
private insurers 
  Prompt corrective action  Regulatory capture, time-inconsistency problem, trigger-levels  
  Living will  Implicit government guarantees, international coordination, 
trigger variable  
  Bank-specific bankruptcy 
laws 
Treatment counterparty risk, distinguishing good and bad 
assets, credibility, international coordination  
 
We identify four generic problems interfere with effective regulation of systemic risk. First, 
systemic risk may be inherently difficult to quantify. Measurement of systemic risk is difficult 
because the externalities that create systemic risk only materialize under extreme circumstances. 
As a consequence, any measure of systemic risk will be very imprecise and will have large error 
margins. In addition, regulators face substantial information asymmetry when assessing 
systemic risk created by banks’ strategic decisions. This implies that one should be cautious of 
policy measures that require a precise measurement of systemic risk or systemic externalities. 
A second obstacle is the robust incentive for banks to evade regulation meant to reduce 
systemic risk. Such regulation effectively taxes the originators of risks for their contribution to 
systemic risk. Evading such a tax is, of course, profitable because it allows banks to take on 
additional risk at the expense of other banks and, ultimately, the taxpayers. This implies that 
policymakers should look for policy measures that are easy to enforce and hard to circumvent.   14 
A third problem is that regulators are prone to forbearance when it comes to systemic risk. 
When designing measures that allow regulators to intervene at an early stage, the incentives for 
regulators to postpone intervention or to take insufficient measures should be taken into 
account. Providing for more external scrutiny in the assessment of systemic risk can reduce the 
scope for regulatory forbearance. 
A final point is that systemic risk is to some extent created by the inability of governments 
to commit not to bail out systemic institutions. The government’s time-inconsistency problem 
creates a private benefit for banks from becoming too systemic too fail. Policies that tie 
regulators’ hands can reduce this problem. 
Conclusion 
The policies that try to reduce systemic risk should meet several requirements. First, they 
should give financial intermediaries the incentive to reduce systemic risk. Second, they should 
give regulators sufficient incentives to intervene and reduce governments’ time-inconsistency 
problem. Third, they should not depend on complex information, but instead be easy to enforce 
and difficult to manipulate. Finally, they should increase market discipline. 
Strengthening market discipline and making optimal use of information generated by 
markets can help to overcome the measurement problem, prevent regulatory gaming, reduce the 
scope for regulatory forbearance, and address governments’ time-inconsistency problem. Policy 
measures that contribute to this goal include prompt corrective action, a bank-specific 
bankruptcy regime, a living will, and isolating crucial parts of the financial system.  15 
1  Introduction 
Sparked off by a deflating bubble in the US housing market, the financial crisis has put the 
spotlight firmly on systemic risk. When systemic risk materialized, initially localized problems 
spiralled out of control and brought the financial system to the brink of collapse. As the first 
world wide financial crisis since the 1930s has made painfully clear, such a near collapse 
imposes large costs on society. To prevent a total meltdown of the financial system, 
governments have spent large sums of money by purchasing assets, providing or guaranteeing 
liquidity, recapitalizing banks, and lowering interest rates. According to the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), governments spent about 30 percent of global GDP on such rescue 
operations. In spite of this massive government intervention, the real economy went into a 
recession because banks were no longer able to efficiently allocate capital and had to reduce 
their supply of credit. 
It is generally accepted that these – near catastrophic – events demonstrate that containing 
‘systemic risk’ should lie at the root of the regulation of banks. It may therefore come as a 
surprise that, in spite of its relevance, no generally accepted definition of the term systemic risk 
exists. In its broadest sense, it refers to any type of risk that threatens the functioning of the 
financial system as a whole. In a narrower sense, it highlights the inherent fragility of banks and 
the effect that a banking crisis has on the real economy. Where some focus on the risks posed 
by macro-economic developments, others point to the mechanisms responsible for propagating 
problems from bank to bank. 
In our view, the potential for one bank’s problems to negatively affect other banks lies at the 
core of these different concepts of systemic risk. This is also the central difference between 
banking and other economic activities, where firms usually benefit if a competitor goes 
bankrupt.
2 If individual banks do not internalise these external effects of their own risk taking 
on other banks, they impose a negative externality on the financial system as a whole. As a 
consequence, from a social welfare point of view banks invest too little in reducing the 
probability or the effect of shocks resulting in too much systemic risk. This study reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature on systemic risk as well as the policy measures that aim to 
contain it. We identify two important channels of systemic risk: contagion within the financial 
sector and the procyclical connection between the financial sector and the real economy. 
Contagion can quickly erode the stability of banks. We define contagion as the propagation 
of problems encountered by one bank to other banks through mechanisms within the financial 
sector.
3 This definition encompasses two crucial aspects. First, a problem at one institution 
 
2 The costs of a collective failure of banks are not the essential difference between the banking sector and other sectors in 
the economy. When bakeries or car manufacturers collectively go bankrupt, this also imposes large costs on society.  
3 The term contagion is used with different meanings. Rochet and Tirole (1996) use the term systemic risk as a synonym for 
contagion, and define the latter as “the propagation of an agent’s economic distress to other agents linked to that agent 
through financial transactions”. This definition comes closest to ours. Pericoli and Sbracia (2003) use it to describe the 
geographical spread of crises between countries or markets. Allen and Gale (2007) define financial contagion as ‘the 
process by which a crisis that begins in one region or country spreads to an economically linked region or country’.   16 
adversely affects other financial institutions. Second, this relationship results from propagation 
over time instead of the simultaneous effect of common shocks. The mechanisms behind 
interbank contagion are still ill understood. A lack of data makes it difficult to distinguish 
empirically between contagion and spurious correlations due to exposure to common risk 
factors. Therefore, the relevant literature consists mostly of theoretical models that describe 
how small shocks to the financial system could lead to big problems. In essence, these models 
show how the fragile funding structure of individual banks, the informational asymmetry 
inherent in the nature of banking and the network of financial contracts and transactions 
between banks can conspire to bring banks to a collective standstill. An important question is 
whether and how different mechanisms of contagion introduce a fundamental market failure 
that creates a rationale for government intervention. Consensus among economists on this issue 
is still lacking. 
A second important channel for systemic risk is the feedback mechanisms that connect the 
financial sector and the real sector, generally referred to as procyclicality. These feedback 
mechanisms can intensify a financial crisis once it gets going, making a crisis more difficult to 
contain. They work the opposite way in good times, causing banks to take on too much risk, for 
example by increasing leverage or the riskiness of their loan portfolio. 
All these mechanisms have played some role in spreading the financial crisis. Procyclicality 
contributed to the build-up of risks. The crisis started with an asset bubble in the US housing 
market that was fuelled by cheap credit. Explicit and implicit government guarantees allowed 
bankers to make a safe bet by collectively riding the bubble. Banks increased their leverage and 
more and more funded themselves with short-term wholesale debt. When the bubble burst, the 
feedback mechanisms fuelled the crisis. Bank runs spread, as investors inferred from some 
banks’ problems that other financial institutions should also be in trouble. Interbank rates rose 
to unprecedented heights when banks started hoarding liquidity and refused to lend money to 
potentially unsafe competitors. As a consequence, banks were forced to sell assets. The ensuing 
fire sales may have combined with accounting rules to create a downward spiral. Procyclicality 
again played its role as banks became reluctant to extend loans, firms started cutting back on 
costs by reducing inventories, shedding jobs, and shelving investment plans. The ensuing 
recession further reduced the value of banks’ assets, triggering a new round of contagious fire 
sales and causing banks to become even more reluctant to extend credit. 
Because markets will fail to provide the socially optimal level of financial stability, 
governments regulate banks through banking supervision, capital requirements, deposit 
insurance, lender of last resort facilities, and bank crisis resolution. Pre crisis regulation 
focussed on reducing banks’ exposure to idiosyncratic risks. The idea is that the risk of a 
systemic crisis, i.e., a collective failure of banks, can be adequately addressed by reducing the 
risk of failure of individual banks. This point of view does not take into account the external 
effects of one bank’s risk taking on other banks. Characteristics that may seem innocuous from   17 
a disaggregate point of view may create systemic concerns when considered at an aggregate 
level.  
But regulation of systemic risk is not easy. Four generic problems interfere with the 
effective regulation of systemic risk. First, banks took on systemic risk as a way to evade 
regulation. By guaranteeing off-balance sheet vehicles, banks were circumventing capital 
regulation, which did not fully account for such off-balance sheet risks. By directly buying 
securitised subprime mortgages, banks were effectively writing disaster insurance and counting 
the premium as profits. Indeed, regulatory arbitrage of systemic regulation is very profitable 
because the downside is borne entirely by the taxpayer. The scope for such arbitrage may be 
large, because of the considerable information asymmetry between regulators and regulated 
when it comes to systemic risk. The key point is, therefore, to devise measures that are hard to 
game. 
Second, systemic risk may be inherently difficult to quantify. It requires an answer to the 
question: how much more likely becomes the failure of bank B, if bank A takes on more risk? 
Measurement of systemic externalities is difficult because these externalities have to be 
measured in normal times, but their detrimental effect only materializes under extreme 
circumstances. In addition, a calibration of government policies that price these external effects, 
also requires a quantification of the effect of a collective failure of banks. This implies that one 
should be cautious of policy measures that require a very precise measurement of systemic risk 
or systemic externalities. 
A third problem is that regulators are prone to forbearance when it comes to systemic risk, 
i.e., a regulator may be tempted to gamble for resurrection. When a regulator spots an incipient 
crisis, he has to decide whether or not and how to intervene. In making this decision, a regulator 
weighs the private benefits of intervention against the private benefits of non-intervention. 
These private benefits do not necessarily coincide with the public benefits of intervention. 
Commitment problems, limited liability, career concerns and herding incentives may distort a 
regulator’s decisions.  
Fourth, the inability of governments to commit not to bail out systemic institutions may to 
some extent create systemic risk. When systemic risk materializes, there will be immense 
pressure on politicians to provide liquidity to markets and recapitalize or nationalise banks. The 
government’s time-inconsistency problem creates a private benefit from becoming too systemic 
too fail. Policies that tie regulators’ hands can reduce this problem. 
In chapter 2, we briefly discuss our definition of systemic risk and the empirical evidence on 
the costs of financial crises. Chapter 3 reviews the existing theoretical and empirical literature 
on contagion, paying special attention to illiquidity. In chapter 4, we discuss the procyclicality 
of banks’ balance sheets. Chapter 5 we address the policy measures that policymakers can use 
to address systemic risk and identify the generic problems that interfere with the effective 
regulation of systemic risk. We do not discuss macroeconomic policy measures that address   18 
macroeconomic imbalances and lax monetary policy, two of the culprits for the abundance of 
capital that fuelled the bubble in US housing prices.  
As a final remark, we would like to emphasize that both theoretical as well as empirical 
research on these topics is ongoing. In addition, a lively debate between academics, policy 
makers, regulators, and practitioners has erupted on how to regulate systemic risk. This 
document therefore necessarily represents a snapshot of the current state of affairs.   19 
2  Systemic risk 
2.1  What is systemic risk? 
The financial system, consisting of financial intermediaries and financial markets, intermediates 
between those with an excess of funds (for example consumers saving for future consumption) 
and those with a temporary lack of funds (for example firms wanting to invest in productive 
activities). If markets were complete and efficient, financial markets would be able to provide 
the same services as banks do. In that perfect world, banks would be redundant. In the words of 
Freixas and Rochet (1997): ‘Banks are useless in an Arrow-Debrue world’. Financial markets 
are, however, plagued by information asymmetry. The literature on financial intermediation 
argues that banks are a way to overcome these informational problems. The costs of adverse 
selection can be reduced if borrowers form coalitions. Investors can address moral hazard by 
appointing a delegated monitor. Banks can aggregate the liquidity needs of firms and 
consumers. 
In a systemic crisis, the financial sector is disrupted to such an extent that it can no longer 
efficiently perform these functions. According to Mishkin (1999), a financial crisis, “occurs 
when shocks to the financial system interfere with information flows so that the financial 
system can no longer do its job of channelling funds to those with productive investment 
opportunities”. In practise, a systemic crisis arises after the financial system has experienced 
some sort of shock, which subsequently gets amplified as it propagates through the financial 
system. Shocks may be idiosyncratic, for example when a single bank fails due to bad 
management or fraud, or systematic, for example when a recession hits all banks at the same 
time. Mishkin (1999) identifies four basic sources of shocks: (1) deterioration in financial sector 
balance sheets, (2) increases in interest rates, (3) increases in uncertainty, and (4) deterioration 
in non-financial balance sheets. 
In our view, a systemic crisis has three important characteristics: first an initial shock; 
second an amplification mechanism; and third disruption of the financial sector.
4 Systemic risk 
is the probability that such a crisis arises. Systemic risk can therefore be reduced by reducing 
the probability of a shock, by damping the amplification mechanism or by isolation crucial parts 
of the financial system.  
Note that in our definition, in contrast to the definition given by Mishkin (1999), systemic 
risk necessarily involves an amplification mechanism. Our study focuses on these mechanisms, 
which create externalities from individual banks’ risk taking decisions. We identify two 
different types of amplification mechanisms that play a role in systemic risk: contagion within 
the financial sector and pro-cyclical connection between the financial sector and the real 
 
4 Note that in our definition, the probability of a shock to the financial system that hits many banks at the same time, but 
which doesn’t involve some propagation mechanism, does not contribute to systemic risk.   20 
economy. This view of systemic risk as consisting of contagion and procyclicality is 
schematically summarized in Figure 2.1 below.
5 
To the extent that these amplification mechanisms introduce external effects from risk 
taking, individual banks will take too much risk and invest too little in reducing the probability 
or the effect of shocks. Thus, from the perspective of the society as a whole, the banking sector 
will be too sensitive too shocks and will take on too much systemic risk. This creates a rationale 
for government intervention and regulation of bank risk taking. 









2.2  The cost of systemic crises 
At the basis of governments’ concern with systemic risk lie the high social costs associated with 
a systemic crisis. Most times governments have to bail out the weak banking system by large-
scale recapitalization and nationalization operations at tax payers’ expense. According to 
Laeven and Valencia (2008) in about 85 percent of the banking crises the government had to 
recapitalize a bank, while in more than 57 percent of the cases the government even has to 
nationalize a domestic bank. The average fiscal cost of a systemic banking crisis is about 14 
percent of GDP the first five years after the start of the crisis. 
Empirical evidence also shows that financial crises are often very costly in terms of output. 
Cerra and Saxena (2008) estimate that the permanent output loss due to a crisis varies from 4 to 
16 percent of GDP. Claessens et. al (2008) find that recessions associated with credit crunches 
and house price busts tend to be deeper and longer than other recessions. The median 
 
5 De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) call these horizontal externalities and vertical externalities, respectively.   21 
cumulative loss in GDP of 13 recessions associated with both a credit crunch and a house price 
bust is 6.7 percent. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) compare data from the 18 bank-centred 
financial crises with the 2007 US sub-prime crisis. For the five most catastrophic cases (which 
include episodes in Finland, Japan, Norway, Spain, and Sweden), the drop in annual output 
growth from peak to trough is over 5 percent, and growth remained well below pre-crisis trend 
even after three years.
6  
Abstracting from the potential effects on other banks, the failure of a single bank (as 
opposed to the failure of multiple banks resulting in a banking crisis) may also be costly to 
society. If a bank develops relationship-specific abilities to restrain its borrowers’ moral hazard, 
its failure will result in a real loss of value of the bank’s loan portfolio.
7 Investments financed 
by bank loans may have to be liquidated. The liquidation value of a loan is lower than its 
continuation value if some of this value is bank-specific. Also, if banks have private, non-
verifiable information about the creditworthiness of their borrowers, these borrowers may no 
longer be able to acquire funding for profitable investments if their bank has collapsed. If a 
particular bank incorporates part of a market infrastructure, like payment- or settlement 
systems, such infrastructure may temporarily break down when a bank goes bankrupt. Finally, 
bank failures may impose negative externalities on bank customers. Uninsured depositors may 
be locked out of their deposits while the bank is restructured, and borrowers may fail to receive 
due lines of credit. 
 
6 The pre-crisis growth rates are a result of the rapid credit expansion in these years. So, it is hard to compare the pre-crisis 
and the post-crisis economic growth rates. Besides a stock effect resulting from a temporarily lower growth rate, a crisis may 
also lead to permanently lower growth rates. It remains unclear whether, and if so to what extent, such a flow effect exists. 
7 If a bank sells its loans below their actual value it incurs a loss. However, this amounts to transfer from the bank’s creditors 
to the new owners of the loans.   22   23 
3  Contagion 
In the years preceding the crisis, banks increased their leverage and their reliance on short-term 
funding. The flip side of increased leverage is reduced equity. Consequently, a small drop in 
value of a bank’s assets can force it to recapitalize. Increased reliance on short-term funding 
implies that a large fraction of a bank’s financiers can withdraw their funds quickly. A bank 
will then either have to sell assets or attract new financiers. Both developments therefore make 
banks more sensitive to shocks to their balance sheets.  
By itself, however, increased sensitivity of individual banks to shocks due to higher leverage 
or greater reliance on short-term funding does not imply a higher probability that a large 
number of banks get into trouble at the same time, i.e., increased systemic risk. Indeed, in most 
markets a firm benefits if one of its competitors goes bankrupt. If a car manufacturer goes 
bankrupt, the suppliers of car parts will compete more vigorously to supply the remaining car 
manufacturers, lowering input costs, and the retail market for cars will become less competitive, 
raising retail prices. In most markets, if firms choose higher risk, that is their business.  
Why are banks different? It is generally assumed, although by no means trivial, that banks 
are different because one bank’s problems may propagate to other banks, spreading initially 
localised problems throughout the financial system. If individual banks do not internalise the 
effects of their own risk taking on other banks, they impose a negative systemic risk externality 
on the financial system. As a consequence, from a social welfare point of view, banks invest too 
little in reducing the probability or the effect of shocks resulting in too much systemic risk. This 
increases the probability that a large number of banks get into trouble at the same time. Because 
such a collective failure of banks is very costly for society, the existence of these externalities 
creates a rationale for government intervention and regulation of bank risk taking. 
The question remains, however, what mechanisms lie behind these externalities? This 
section aims to summarize the theoretical and empirical literature on this issue. The literature 
identifies a number of potential mechanisms for shocks experienced by one bank to propagate 
to other banks, which can be roughly grouped into three classes. 
First, the problems faced by bank A may lead to a loss for bank B because some of its assets 
drop in value. Such a negative effect on bank B’s asset prices may occur directly or indirectly. 
Direct effects arise due to bilateral contracts or exposure. As bank A becomes more likely to 
default on its payments, the value of such contracts decreases. Indirect effects arise due to 
exposure to mutual borrowers or creditors.  
Note, however, that even though problems may propagate from one bank to another through 
these interconnections, this does not immediately imply the existence of externalities. For 
example, assume that links between banks arise because of bilateral contracts that insure banks 
against liquidity shocks. The links between banks then arise endogenously. Because banks price 
the risk of a liquidity shock, what may look like an externality ex post can simply be a correctly 
priced exposure to risk ex ante.   24 
Second, even if bank B’s assets are unaffected, the problems faced by bank A may negatively 
affect bank B’s ability to fund itself. This happens if bank A’s problems cause conditions for 
recapitalisation or refinancing of bank B’s short-term debt to tighten. As we will see, this may 
be caused by adverse selection due to asymmetric information, fire sales due to incomplete 
contracts or liquidity hoarding due to market power. Externalities then arise because a bank 
doesn’t take into account the effects on other banks of its decision to sell assets or to withhold 
liquidity from the market.  
Third, shocks can also spread from bank to bank through informational spillovers. For 
example, bank runs can spread because a run on one bank implies information about other 
banks that allows rational agents to update their beliefs. More generally, one bank’s problems 
may generate adverse information about other banks. This can be information about the 
intensity with which central banks or creditors monitor banks’ management, the value of banks’ 
assets
8, or an event that reveals the existence of an aggregate liquidity shortage. 
Below, we review the theoretical literature that describes various mechanisms for these 
channels of contagion. We pay particular attention to papers that focus on the current crisis. For 
a pre-crisis review of the literature, see de Bandt and Hartmann (2000). For more recent post-
crisis reviews see Wagner (2009) or Allen et. al (2009). 
3.1  Interconnectedness 
A first way in which financial distress may spread is through direct and indirect 
interconnections between banks. Such interconnections are ubiquitous in the financial sector, in 
contrast to most industries where firms do not seem to be interconnected through an intricate 
web of financial contracts.
9 
Direct interdependencies arise from interbank on-balance and off-balance sheet exposures. 
These direct contractual connections may be due to payment and settlement relationships, for 
example credit lines that facilitate the transfer of money from one bank to another through the 
large-value payment system. They can also result from the cross holding of deposits for 
clearance, regulatory or insurance reasons. Another source may be counter-party credit 
exposure on derivatives, or loans in the interbank market that allow banks to insure against 
liquidity shocks. 
Most of these exposures arise endogenously. Why do banks choose to be interconnected? 
One reason is that banks experience shocks to their liquidity needs, for example because 
depositors withdraw funds, because borrowers default on their loans, because new investment 
opportunities arise, or because the value of their assets decreases. Because these shocks are (to 
 
8 If correlations in underlying value across banks exist. 
9 Subcontracting in non-financial industries may also imply interconnections. Subcontracting, however, mostly occurs 
between vertically related firms, whereas interconnections between banks are horizontal.   25 
some extent) uncorrelated, banks can reduce the amount of liquid assets they have to hold by 
pooling their liquidity needs. Interbank connections are one way of doing this.  
On the one hand, such interbank connections allow for more efficient risk sharing between 
banks exposed to idiosyncratic shocks. When liquidity is scarce, it is efficient for banks with a 
temporary surplus of funds to provide liquidity to banks that temporarily need it. This reduces 
the vulnerability of individual banks. 
However, these links may allow problems faced by one bank to spread to other banks. 
Interconnectedness played an important role in the decision of the US government to bail out 
the investment bank Bear Stearns and the insurer AIG. For example, the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, declared that ‘Global banks and investment banks would have 
suffered losses on loans and lines of credit to AIG, and on derivatives with AIG-FP. The banks’ 
combined exposures exceeded $50 billion. Money market mutual funds and others that held 
AIG’s roughly $20 billion of commercial paper would also have taken losses. In addition, 
AIG’s insurance subsidiaries had substantial derivatives exposures to AIG-FP that could have 
weakened them in the event of the parent company’s failure.’
10 
In the presence of interbank contractual relations, if one bank fails other banks will have to 
write down their claims on the failing bank. This may create fragility in two ways. First, a shock 
pushing one bank towards bankruptcy will decrease the value of connected banks’ assets, 
reduce their capital levels, and therefore increase the likelihood that they will face bank runs. 
Second, if regulation or market discipline demand a minimum level of bank capital, a shock 
may force it to attract new capital, reduce its lending, or sell assets. 
A number of papers explicitly model how interconnections can lead to contagion. Dasgupta 
(2004) argues that the cross holding of deposits can lead to contagious effects. Such cross 
holding may be motivated by imperfectly correlated regional liquidity shocks, clearance or 
regulatory reasons. The depositors of a bank receive some information about the state of 
fundamentals in their region, and update their beliefs about eventual returns on bank deposits. 
This may result in runs on that bank. Conditional on the failure of a debtor bank, a creditor bank 
fails for a wider range of its own fundamentals than if the debtor bank survived. Consequently, 
there are regions of fundamentals in which a creditor bank fails if and only if the debtor bank 
fails. Thus, interbank deposits lead to contagion by triggering the failure of the creditor bank. 
Allen and Gale (2000) consider a model where regional banks hold claims on banks in other 
regions as insurance against regional shocks to consumer liquidity needs. If these regional 
shocks are uncorrelated, i.e., there is no aggregate uncertainty, an interbank market yields 
optimal liquidity insurance. The interconnectedness resulting from these interbank claims, 
however, may create the potential for interbank contagion. When hit by a liquidity shock, banks 
can choose to either liquidate their claims on other banks or their long-term assets. Only the 
latter option creates liquidity. Thus, liquidating long-term assets exerts a positive externality on 
 
10 Statement for the Committee on Financial Services of the US House of Representatives, March 24, 2009. AIG-FP refers 
to AIG Financial Products.   26 
other banks. Liquidating long-term assets, however, is costly and banks prefer to liquidate their 
claims on other banks. Whether contagion occurs depends on the pattern of cross holdings of 
deposits. If the network is complete, in other words, every bank is directly connected to every 
other bank, then interconnections make the financial system more robust against shocks. An 
incomplete network, however, introduces fragility because a liquidity shock that could be 
absorbed if spread over all regions, can end-up disproportionally hitting some regions, 
triggering bank runs and bankruptcy.  
Freixas et al. (2000) show how shocks can spread through the payment system.
11 In the 
model different banks operate in different regions. Banks’ depositors from one region may want 
to withdraw cash to spend on consumption in another region. As a consequence, banks run 
liquidity risk because they can suddenly be confronted with large cash withdrawals. Interbank 
credit lines allow banks to cushion these shocks and reduce the cost of holding liquid assets. If 
depositors from one region wish to consume at some other region, but believe that the 
corresponding bank at that location does not have enough cash, they turn to their home bank 
instead. As a result, the home bank may be obliged to liquidate some of its assets. The problems 
of this bank may then trigger depositors from other regions that wanted to withdraw to turn to 
their home bank as well. Consequently, a solvency shock can cause the entire system to 
collapse. Note that there is an externality since depositors force their home bank to liquidate 
because they do not trust the quality of the assets of the corresponding bank. 
Interdependencies can also be indirect, because of a common exposure to borrowers or 
lenders, or because banks endogenously choose to hold correlated portfolios. Wealth effects 
coupled with risk aversion may also lead to contagion if a group of investors lends to the same 
set of borrowers. Suppose investors lend to the same two borrowers. Each borrower might face 
a self-fulfilling crisis where investors withdraw their money because they expect others to do 
the same. Such a crisis reduces the investors’ wealth, which increases their risk aversion. In 
turn, this increases their incentive to withdraw their investments from the other borrowers (Kyle 
and Xiong, 2001, Goldstein and Pauzner, 2004). 
The literature on systemic risk and interconnectedness treats the network of interconnections 
largely as exogenous. Of course, in reality, the web of contractual relations that interconnects 
financial intermediaries arises endogenously in response to idiosyncratic shocks. Banks choose 
to diversify or write insurance contracts, and they will price the risks involved. Because the 
links between banks are endogenous, what may look like externalities ex post may actually be a 
correctly priced exposure to risk ex ante. 
Although interconnections between banks seem to be an obvious source of externalities, 
models that treat the web of interconnections as endogenous and that can guide us in assessing 
 
11 See also Freixas and Parigi (1998), who compare contagion in net and gross payment systems. In a net payment system, 
banks extend credit to each other and settle at the end of the day. In a gross payment system, banks settle transactions on 
a one-to-one basis with central bank money.   27 
the policy consequences of interconnectedness are largely absent.
12 An exception is a recent 
paper by Allen et al. (2010). They consider the systemic risk resulting from overlapping 
portfolio exposures and investigate when different network structures are stable. They show that 
there does not exists a monotonic relationship welfare and between interconnectedness. We 
should therefore be careful in drawing policy conclusions on the optimal level of 
interconnectedness or the type of interconnections. There may be better reasons than 
interconnectedness to save entities such as AIG. We turn to those next. 
3.2  Liquidity 
A bank depends on liquidity when it has to refinance its short-term debt, attract capital to 
manage temporary liquidity shortages, or when it has to deleverage by shrinking the asset side 
of the balance sheet. We can distinguish between two types of liquidity: market liquidity and 
funding liquidity. Funding liquidity is the ability to attract new investors by issuing new 
wholesale deposits, long-term bonds or equity. Market liquidity is the ability to sell assets or to 
use them as collateral that can be offered to external financiers.
13 Assets can be sold directly if 
they are easily tradable, or through securitization if they are information-sensitive. The value of 
information sensitive assets changes with the arrival of new information (Gorton and Pennachi, 
1990). Thus, information sensitive securities create an incentive to gather information. Such 
assets create information asymmetry between informed and uninformed buyers. This is not the 
case for information insensitive assets. Securitization can be seen as a way to create an 
information insensitive asset out of multiple information sensitive assets (Huang et al., 2009). 
Reduced funding liquidity or reduced market liquidity creates problems for banks that face 
liquidity needs. We will see below, however, that a bank’s failure or its response to shocks may 
reduce liquidity available to other banks. This is an important second mechanism for contagion. 
Such liquidity freezes have been the defining aspect of this financial crisis. Markets broke 
down in several waves. In the first wave, when the high risk of subprime mortgage-backed 
securities became apparent, market liquidity as well as funding liquidity dried up for structured 
investment vehicles. When a correlated increase in mortgage payment delinquencies hit the 
market for securitised loans, the market value of these mortgage-backed securities plummeted 
as potential buyers became increasingly uncertain about their value. On 31 July 2007, two Bear 
Stearns hedge funds filed for bankruptcy, and Bear Stearns blocked investors from withdrawing 
from a third fund. On 7 August 2007, BNP Paribas halted withdrawal from three investment 
funds and suspended calculations of net present value of these funds. Lenders withdrew from 
 
12 Castiglionesi et. al (2010) investigate how increased financial integration affects financial intermediaries’ incentives to hold 
liquidity. Under integration, banks hold less liquid assets, an effect which is stronger if there is less aggregate uncertainty. 
They assume the interbank market to be complete in the sense that they assume that all banks contract with all other banks. 
Leitner (2005) characterizes optimal networks. In his model, linkages create the threat of contagion, which allows agents to 
commit to help each other, but may also be the cause of collapse of the entire system. Hence linkages that create the threat 
of contagion may be optimal. 
13 See Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) on the distinction between funding and market liquidity.   28 
the sale and repurchase market (the “repo” market) that was essential in financing the off-
balance sheet vehicles used to securitize mortgages.  
 In the second wave, the interest rates at which banks were able to borrow money in the 
interbank market rose substantially. To prevent bankruptcy of their ‘shadow banks’ the banks 
that originally set-up these investment vehicles to arbitrage regulation had to step in and the risk 
of their off-balance liabilities materialized. Banks that were suspected of having a large 
exposure to these problems experienced runs in the wholesale market and the market for short-
term debt. Such a run resulted in the failure of Bear Stearns, halfway march 2008. As 
uncertainty about the value of banks’ securitised assets and their off-balance sheet liabilities 
grew, interbank interest rates started to rise. This created a lemons problem (Akerlof, 1974): 
although on aggregate it was clear that some banks should be in trouble, nobody knew exactly 
the exposure of individual banks to these risks. Lenders had to take into account that they might 
be lending money to a bank with toxic assets and increased their interest rates. Thus, the lemons 
problems in the interbank market reduced banks’ ability to ensure liquidity through interbank 
lending.
14  
The failure of Lehman Brothers on 15 September 2008 triggered the final wave. When the 
US government refused to bailout Lehman Brothers, the interbank market froze completely. 
Banks were no longer able or willing to lend to each other. This posed great problems for banks 
that relied on the interbank market to roll over their short-term debt.
15 
In this section, we review the theoretical literature on market freezes and reduced liquidity. 
This literature identifies several mechanisms. Market freezes and reduced liquidity can arise as 
a consequence of fire sales, adverse selection, or liquidity hoarding. See also Tirole (2009) for a 
concise overview. 
Fire sales 
Fire sales arise if selling assets reduces the market price of these assets. This is also referred to 
as cash-in-the-market-pricing. The sale of assets may reduce prices because the number of 
potential buyers of assets is limited (Allen and Gale, 1998), because assets need to be sold to 
outside investors who are at a disadvantage in employing these assets (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1992), or because buying more assets increases risk-aversion (Kyle and Xiong, 2001). 
The central question now becomes how fire sales negatively affect other financial 
institutions. Problems may arise as a consequence of asymmetric information. Agency problems 
may lead banks to include a loss-threshold into their contracts with traders (Morris and Shin, 
2004), or investors to withdraw their money when a fund’s value falls below a certain level 
(Vayanos, 2004; Wagner, 2006). An initial drop in asset prices due to fire sales may then trigger 
 
14 Alternatively, the value of holding on to liquidity may have risen because of the prospect of future fire-sales or increased 
uncertainty about liquidity shocks. 
15 For those who want more detail, several excellent reviews exist of the sequence of events that created a situation where 
financial markets could only function with widespread explicit government support (Gorton, 2008; Hellwig, 2008; Calomiris, 
2008; Brunnermeier, 2009; Greenlaw et al. 2008; Tirole, 2008)   29 
further sell-offs by traders or fund managers of other financial institutions who try to pre-empt 
their competitors by selling their assets, lowering prices even further. 
In a setting where traders create liquidity by smoothing intertemporal discrepancies in the 
demand for securities, traders’ funding, i.e., the capital and the margins they are charged, may 
depend on market liquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) show that, if drops in assets 
market liquidity lead to increased margin requirements or losses on traders’ positions and 
traders are margin constrained, a drop in market liquidity forces traders to reduce trading, 
reducing liquidity even further. Small shocks to market liquidity can thus feedback into higher 
margin requirements, resulting in a margin spiral. 
Allen and Gale, in a series of papers (1994, 1998, 2000, and 2004) develop a liquidity-based 
approach to understanding financial crises. When financial markets are incomplete, financial 
institutions may be forced to sell assets if they face a liquidity shock. Because the liquid asset 
has a lower return than the risky asset, suppliers of liquidity have to be compensated for holding 
the liquid asset. They can recoup these costs if they can buy assets at fire sale prices when 
liquidity shocks hit. Fire sales are an equilibrium phenomenon, where the suppliers of liquidity 
recoup the opportunity costs of holding excess liquidity. Lower market prices, however, imply 
that more assets have to be sold in order to meet a particular liquidity needs. This inflicts a 
negative externality on other banks because it becomes more costly for them to recapitalize 
when they are hit by a liquidity shock. If enough banks are hit by a shock at the same time, the 
attempt to obtain liquidity may even be self-defeating and force banks into default. 
In Wagner (2006), the fire-sale externality depends on how similar banks are. If banks assets 
are more similar, then the externalities are stronger. Not only does the probability that both 
banks have to liquidate assets at the same time increases because assets are similar, but the 
reduction in prices when fire sales occur will also be larger if both banks are in bad health than 
when one of the banks is in good health. 
Incomplete markets are the driving force behind fire sales. Fire sales arise because banks are 
forced to sell assets to obtain liquidity. If financial intermediaries were able to contract liquidity 
contingent on the state of nature, they could prevent such forced sales and fire sales would not 
occur. Such contracting would be possible in complete markets. The incomplete market for 
liquidity therefore provides a clear rationale for government intervention. 
Adverse selection 
Other explanations of reduced liquidity depend on the presence of asymmetric information.
16 
Shocks may exacerbate asymmetric information, thereby leading to higher prices or even a total 
drying-up of markets if the lemons problem becomes unmanageable. In Flannery (1996) shocks 
increase lenders’ uncertainty on their own ability and that of other banks to assess whether they 
 
16 Cabalero and Simsek (2009) present a model where imploding assets prices increase the complexity of the banks 
environment: as more banks get into trouble, healthy banks need to understand more and more linkages. When knowledge 
about these linkages is imperfect, banks uncertainty increases as complexity grows.    30 
are dealing with a good or a bad borrower. Lenders therefore face a winners’ curse, which may 
become unmanageable in bad times. 
Heider et al. (2008) focus on the credit risk problem due to asymmetric information about 
counterparty risk. If banks face liquidity shocks as well as shocks to the quality of their 
investment portfolios which are both private information, banks that want to lend money to 
other banks cannot distinguish between a solvent bank that needs additional liquidity and an 
insolvent bank trying to stay afloat. In such a setting, lending in the interbank market may be 
subject to a lemons problem. As the severity of the lemons problem increases, the interbank rate 
rises to a point where the market collapses completely. Their study, however, only explains ex 
post why markets may have dried up. It doesn’t analyse why banks expose themselves to such a 
risk ex ante and whether such exposure might be optimal or not. 
Bolton et al. (2009) study the evolution of liquidity crises in a setting where some investors 
face uncertain liquidity needs and may want to sell some of their assets. Potential buyers cannot 
tell whether a sale is due to a sudden liquidity need, or whether the investor is trying to sell a 
lemon. The asset owners learn more about the quality of their assets as time passes. Thus, the 
asymmetric information problem becomes worse over time. Investors therefore face a choice 
between selling early, thus avoiding the lemons problem, and betting on the probability that 
they will not face any liquidity problem, with the possibility of a much greater price discount in 
the future. 
Dang et al. (2009) observe that a security’s information sensitivity varies with the news 
arriving about the quality of the underlying asset or borrower. The value of debt is insensitive to 
new information if the prospects of repayment are favourable. A change in the quality of the 
underlying asset or borrower will not affect the value of debt much. In fact, Dang et al. (2009) 
show that debt is a least information-sensitive security. If the situation deteriorates, and the 
probability of default on the debt claim becomes considerable, additional information about the 
state of the underlying asset becomes valuable. A change in this value may then imply a change 
in the value of the security, and investors with sufficient capabilities have a strong incentive to 
acquire such information. As a consequence, the market becomes divided in informed and 
uninformed investors. In this way, the market for the security can switch from a liquid, 
symmetric information market where nobody has information on the quality of the security, 
because it doesn’t matter anyway, to an illiquid market plagued with adverse selection, where 
some have information but others don’t. In this sense, ‘ignorance is bliss’. Morris and Shin 
(2009) present a similar argument. 
Liquidity hoarding 
Liquidity has features of a common good. Indeed, creating liquidity may benefit other financial 
intermediaries. In Bhattacharya and Gale (1987) banks insure against liquidity shocks through 
an interbank lending market, but the composition of liquid and illiquid assets in each bank’s 
portfolio as well as the size of each bank’s liquidity shock are private information. A bank may   31 
meet depositor withdrawals by keeping excess cash or by selling claims to other banks with 
excess cash. Since liquid assets yield lower returns, banks under-invest in liquid assets and free 
ride on the common liquidity pool. Hence, even in the presence of an interbank market, there 
can be aggregate liquidity shortages.  
A related line of thought is explored by Diamond and Rajan (2005), who explore a model 
where banks experience a liquidity shock because projects’ payouts are delayed. To make up 
for the temporary shortage, banks can choose between attracting new deposits by increasing 
interest rates and liquidating outstanding loans. Attracting depositors merely reallocates cash 
from one bank to another. Only liquidating outstanding loans increases aggregate liquidity but 
in an inefficient way. Although it creates immediate liquidity, it produces only a fraction of the 
outstanding amount. In addition, increasing the interest rate also decreases the value of banks’ 
assets, because it decreases the present value of the cash flows generated by these assets. 
Therefore, before banks collectively have enough incentive to produce the desired amount of 
aggregate liquidity, other banks may become insolvent. The ensuing bank run on the insolvent 
bank may further increase the liquidity shortage since all assets are liquidated early in an effort 
to create immediate liquidity. 
Diamond and Rajan (2009) argue that bank management facing a liquidity shock will refuse 
to sell assets at fire sale prices, because, conditional on the bank’s survival, the price of the asset 
will also recover. Even though bank management can take precautionary measures by selling 
illiquid assets, they prefer holding on to these assets because the states in which the depressed 
asset value recovers are also the states in which the bank survives. At the same time, the 
prospect of a future liquidity shock makes excess cash more valuable because it can be used to 
buy assets at fire sale prices when the liquidity shock hits.
17 By refusing to sell the illiquid asset, 
the bank’s management shifts risk to a third party, in this case their debtholders. 
Holmström and Tirole (2009, chapter 7) present a model where banks hoard costly liquidity 
in order to overbid rivals in the market for distressed assets. Banks with sufficient cash, instead 
of buying assets of distressed institutions at fire-sale prices now, prefer to wait because they 
expect to be able to buy them at even lower prices in the near future. 
Acharya, Gromb and Yorulmazer (2008) focus on issues arising due to market power and 
strategic behaviour of liquidity-surplus banks. They investigate what happens if (i) surplus 
banks that provide liquidity have market power, (ii) there are frictions in the lending market due 
to moral hazard, and (iii) assets are bank-specific. They show that when the outside options of 
needy banks are weak, surplus banks may strategically under-provide lending, thereby inducing 
inefficient sales of bank-specific assets. 
 
17 Allen,et al. (2008) argue that if interbank markets are incomplete and banks are unable to hedge the idiosyncratic and 
aggregate liquidity shocks that they face, situations where banks stop trading with each other can be constrained efficient.   32 
3.3  Information spillovers 
Shocks can also spread from bank to bank through informational spillovers. For example, bank 
runs can spread because a run on one bank implies information about other banks that allows 
rational agents to update their beliefs. More generally, one bank’s problems may generate 
adverse information about other banks. This can be information about the intensity of 
monitoring, the value of assets if correlations in underlying value across banks exist, or the 
existence of an aggregate liquidity. 
Suppose that the value of assets is correlated across banks and some depositors are better 
informed than others about the value of bank assets. Informed depositors can withdraw early 
when a bank’s assets are insufficient to repay all depositors. Uninformed depositors realize this 
and therefore respond to information about early withdrawals. Failures of other banks can be 
one such information source (Chen, 1999). 
Aghion et al. (2000) consider a free banking system with an interbank loan market 
facilitated by a central clearing house, where the cash flow realization of each bank is private 
information and interbank loan offers can not be made contingent on aggregate liquidity. If 
there is no aggregate liquidity shortage, no failure occurs because other banks can always serve 
a bank with a shortage. A failure of one of the clearinghouse members thus signals an aggregate 
liquidity shortage. This may then trigger a run on all the banks in the system. 
In Rochet and Tirole (1996) peer monitoring is valuable to control bank moral hazard, but it 
also introduces a link between banks that may allow a crisis to spread from one bank to another. 
If one bank fails, creditors assume that other banks have not been properly monitored and a 
general collapse occurs. 
In Acharya and Yorulmazer (2003) banks endogenously choose to hold correlated portfolios 
because regulators cannot commit not to intervene if too many banks fail at the same time. 
When bank loan returns have a systematic factor, the failure of one bank conveys adverse 
information about this systematic factor and increases the cost of borrowing for the surviving 
banks. This increases the likelihood of joint failure. 
Increased homogeneity of banks’ balance sheets increases the probability of a joint failure of 
financial institutions, because it increases the potential externalities on other banks from an 
individual bank’s liquidity problems. Because a shock is more likely to affect multiple banks at 
the same time, fire sales will be stronger and problems will propagate faster throughout the 
financial sector. This suggests that encouraging diversity among financial institution may 
decrease systemic risk (Wagner, 2009).   33 
3.4  Empirical evidence 
In this section, we survey the existing empirical literature on systemic events and systemic 
crises, focusing on empirical analyses of contagion. We divide the studies into micro-level 
studies which either use balance sheet or payment system data to run simulations and studies 
that try to infer contagion from market data and use different types of systemic events as an 
identification mechanism in a regression analysis.  
One obvious shortcoming of the whole literature on contagion is the inability to distinguish 
between the effects of contagion and simple interdependence. Much of the current literature on 
banking crises and contagion often confounds the effects of real side interdependencies, such as 
trade links and financial system integration with the effects of “real contagion” (Karolyi, 2003). 
Future studies, using data on the current crisis will be very helpful in addressing this problem. 
3.4.1  Micro-level simulation studies 
In general, the simulation literature on banking crises focuses on the potential risk of a banking 
failure due to contagion. A commonly used empirical methodology to assess financial sector 
linkages is the network approach which tracks the reverberation of a credit event or liquidity 
squeeze throughout the banking system via direct linkages in the interbank market. One set of 
studies focuses on contagion due to balance sheet connections; another set assesses contagion 
due to connections through the payment system. 
The first group of studies use the balance sheet of banks or information from credit registers 
and simulates the effect of a failure of the largest interbank participant. Some estimate optimal 
exposure of interbank market participants, others use accounting data. Sheldon and Maurer 
(1998; United kingdom), Furfine (2003; US), Cifuentes (2003; Chile), Upper and Worms 
(2004; Germany), Wells (2002; 2004; United Kingdom), Krznar (2009; Croatia), Lelyveld and 
Liedorp (2006; the Netherlands), Memmel and Stein (2008; Germany), Lubloy (2005; 
Hungary), Amundsen and Arnt (2005; Denmark), Mistrulli (2007) and Duggar and Mitra (2007, 
Ireland) measure the level of contagion by simulating the consequences of an individual bank 
failure given observed or estimated interbank exposures and look at the potential domino 
effects. The general conclusion of this set of studies is that although the impact of contagion on 
banking sector default differs between countries and domino effects through interbank credit 
exposures are possible, the likelihood of large scale banking defaults caused by contagion is 
relatively small.  
However, these studies only focus on the direct effect of contagion and not on the contagion 
effect through other channels, for example contagion through information spillovers. According 
to Degryse and Nguyen (2007) the default of some large foreign banks has the potential to 
trigger significant domino effects in Belgium. The studies mentioned above neglect this aspect. 
Blavarg and Nimander (2002) conclude that the risk of contagion from abroad in the Swedish 
banking system mainly arises from foreign exchange settlement exposures. In a number of cases   34 
a loss due to failure of a foreign counterparty of a Swedish bank pushes its capital ratio below 
the regulatory level. Thus, it is important to take into account such cross-border effects. 
Several other studies have tried to simulate the occurrence of contagion by assessing the 
impact of the failure of a bank in the payments system. This strand of literature makes use of 
data from large value payment systems. For instance, Furfine (2001) uses Fedwire data to show 
how the failure of the largest banks in the US payments system would affect the liquidity 
position of its counterparties. Northcott (2002) follows a similar strategy to assess the likelihood 
of contagion in the Canadian Automated Clearing Settlement System (ACSS). After examining 
various scenarios, she concludes that the risk of contagion in the ACSS is very limited. The 
general conclusion that can be drawn from these simulation studies is that it is difficult to 
induce large-scale operational contagious banking failures through a default in the payments 
system or interbank market.  
Some studies combine these two approaches. Elsinger et al. (2006) simulate the joint impact 
of interest rate shocks, exchange rate shocks, and stock market movements on interbank 
payment flows of Austrian banks. Their simulations indicate that although the likelihood of 
contagious default is low compared to the total default probability, there are situations in which 
the majority of the defaults are due to contagion when there is a combined high level of market 
risk and credit risk. Müller (2006) combines a network and a simulation approach to assess the 
risk of contagion in the Swiss interbank market and takes account of credit and liquidity effects 
in bank contagion. He concludes that there is substantial potential for contagion particularly in 
centralized markets. However, a lender of last resort intervention could reduce spillover effects 
considerably. These studies indicate that, although the risk of domestic contagion is relatively 
small, there are large differences between countries in the exposure to potential foreign 
contagion risk. 
Several caveats apply. First, to the extent that detailed information on banks’ bilateral 
exposures is not available, these methodologies make assumptions on the network of 
interconnections. For example, they may assume that each bank is connected to every other 
bank. This may be quite different from the actual structure. Consequently, the findings of 
interbank simulation studies depend on these assumptions and tend to underestimate the risk of 
contagion (Mistrulli, 2007). Second, these studies do not allow for bank recapitalisation. Such 
recapitalisation will act as a cushion to soften the shock. These studies may therefore also 
overestimate a shock’s effect. See Nguyen (2003) for issues regarding underestimation or 
overestimation. Finally, all these studies neglect the existence of externalities of a banking 
failure. Information spillovers could lead to a domino effect through bank runs or liquidity can 
dry up be because it may be uncertain which banks are in trouble.     35 
3.4.2  Micro-level event studies 
An alternative approach to study contagion risk is to try to measure contagion from market data 
such as stock prices or credit-default swap spreads. However, studies differ as to what they 
define as systemic events. Some studies look at extreme variations in prices and define a 
systemic event as the tails of the distribution of returns. Other studies only look at events where 
banks failed. 
A first group of studies tries to identify contagion from information on historical tail-risk 
events. One approach focuses on tail-betas and measure the covariation between different 
banks’ share price conditional on a large drop in share prices. The resulting correlation matrix 
then allows one to derive predictions about individual banks values conditional on a crash in a 
banking index (see e.g. Hartmann et al., 2006). Gropp et al. (2006) find evidence for both 
domestic and cross-border contagion within Europe, although domestic contagion seems to 
dominate cross-border contagion. However, the effect of foreign contagion has increased after 
the introduction of the euro, which created a more integrated money market. Acharya et al. 
(2008) use the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES), which is defined as the average loss by an 
institution when the market is in its left tail. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2009) introduce a banks 
CoVaR. This is defined as the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of financial institutions conditional on other 
institutions being under distress. They claim that the increase of CoVaR relative to VaR 
measures spillover risk among institutions. 
The second set of studies use real-life systemic crises to identify the contagion effect of a 
banking failure. Some of these event studies test for correlation in bank failures. In general, 
these studies regress the number of bank failures in some period on the number of bank failures 
in a later period, provided that all macroeconomic shocks are effectively covered by the control 
variables. A positive and significant coefficient indicates that bank failures lead to contagion. 
However, since the safety net provisions in modern financial systems, such as deposit insurance 
schemes and lender of last resort facilities tend to prevent such a domino effect, these studies 
are restricted to historical periods of the US when deposit insurance was absent (Brandt and 
Hartmann, 2000). The empirical results of Grossman (1993), Hasan and Dwyer (1994), and 
Schoenmaker (1996) all indicate that there was significant contagion within banking failures in 
the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century in the US. However, Hartmann and Brand (2005) 
criticize these results. By controlling the correlation for a large set of macroeconomic factor it 
creates multicolinearity in these factors. Also there is an endogeneity problem which indicates 
that the relationship between the correlation of bank failures and the macroeconomic factors is 
probably driven by a third variable. As a result the evidence on contagion is inconsistent. and 
therefore not convincing. 
A different approach to examining contagion in the interbank market during banking a crisis 
is to compare the normal stock return of a bank to the actually observed returns at the 
announcement date of the ‘bad news’ or during a window around this date. The hypothesis is 
that when there is a failure of bank A the stock price of bank B will react if contagion exists.   36 
Aharony and Swary (1983) analyze the three largest bank failures in US history (Franklin 
National Bank of New York, US National Bank of San Diego and the Hamilton National Bank 
of Chattanooga) in an attempt to detect contagion effects on the performance of the banking 
industry and the economy as a whole. The analysis uses the share prices of three solvent bank 
groups of different size and of each failing bank to measure their abnormal performance in the 
weeks surrounding each bankruptcy date. Critical events related to each bank failure are 
detected for this purpose. A distinction is made between bank failures that might have been 
caused by adverse activities whose revelation is assumed to be uncorrelated across banks (e.g., 
fraud) and failures caused by problems common to many banks in the industry. They conclude 
that the data does not support the ‘pure contagion effect’ hypothesis. 
In contrast, Swary (1986) does find evidence for contagion in the interbank market as a 
reaction to the Continental Illinois crisis, in terms of both stock price movements and trading 
activity, especially for the group of banks with a low rate of solvability. Such market reaction 
could reflect either a bank-run effect or an adjustment to new information revealed in the crisis. 
The evidence seems to be consistent with investors' reaction in an efficient market that operates 
under imperfect information and might indeed have led to a bank run and, hence, to a kind of 
domino effect.  
Wall and Peterson (1990) provide evidence consistent with the argument that the bailout 
weakened market discipline. They evaluated daily returns during the week in which Continental 
failed, whilst controlling for developments in the Latin American loan market during that week. 
They find no contagion effects on abnormal returns of other banks. Instead, banks that were 
heavily exposed to Continental had positive abnormal returns when the government announced 
a full guarantee of all Continental creditors.  
Lamy and Thompson (1986) and Peavy and Hempel (1988) examine contagion effects 
caused by Penn Square’s failure, with mixed results. According to Lamy and Thomson (1986) 
the failure and subsequent liquidation of Penn Square was interpreted by the market as a 
conformation of an underlying change of risk of the banking system as a whole. In contrast, 
Peavy and Hempel (1988) conclude that the market viewed the Penn Square failure as an 
isolated event that did not significantly affect banks in other regions. .Dickinson et al. (1991) 
also fail to find evidence of contagion effects arising from the failure of First Republic Bank. 
The studies listed above are based on contagion within the US banking system. Other 
studies include Gay et al. (1991), who investigate the failure of Hong Kong banks, and Jayanti 
et al. (1996), who investigate the failure of a British bank and two Canadian banks. Gay et al. 
(1991) find evidence of contagion effects, which they attribute to the absence of an explicit 
deposit insurance scheme in Hong Kong. Jayanti et al. (1996) focus on the failure of two 
Canadian banks: Canadian Commercial Bank and Northland Bank. Canadian regulation is 
relatively stringent, and a deposit insurance scheme operates. The authors find some evidence 
for significant contagion and conclude that the market is more likely to react negatively when 
increased regulations are proposed in the wake of a failure. They also examine the failure of the   37 
British bank Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) Limited, but fail to find any significant contagion 
effects in the UK banking sector (Kanas, 2004). 
An alternative way for estimating systemic risk is by measuring the tail risk of a bank. The 
most common used tail risk approach is the value at risk measure which is defined as the risk of 
a loss over a given period and portfolio with fixed confidence levels
18. According to Wagner 
(2009) one major problem of this measure is that it cannot calculate losses larger than the Value 
at Risk. An alternative measure is to calculate the distance to default. The distance to default is 
defined as the number of standard deviations by which the expected asset value exceeds the 
default point. 
However, one large disadvantage of the distance to default and VaR measure is that is 
assumes that banks are working in isolation. These measures do not take into account the direct 
and indirect linkages of banks at the interbank market. Therefore, Adrian and Brunnermeier 
(2009) propose a VaR of the financial sector as a whole.  
An alternative to these tail risk measures is to estimate the tail-betas (Heartmann et al., 
2006). In general this methodology estimates the correlation between assets of various banks at 
the right tail using data from days where stock market prices have fallen abnormal. In contrast, 
Acharya et al. (2008) uses the expected shortfall instead of the correlation between the assets to 





18 For an extensive survey on Value-at-Risk models see Jorion (2006)   38   39 
4  Procyclicality 
The previous section dealt with the mechanisms of contagion within the financial sector. Just as 
important, however, is the question of how fluctuations in the financial system and the real 
sector may reinforce each other, i.e., how credit growth and banks’ risk taking can amplify the 
business cycle and vice versa. This is referred to as procyclicality. 
Figure 4.1 shows how leverage growth and total asset growth are correlated. Banks seem to 
increase their leverage when the value of their assets increases. During an upswing 
procyclicality may cause banks’ balance sheets to become excessively risky, making banks 
more susceptible to shocks.
19 If a banking crisis hits or a recession occurs, procyclicality may 
result in a particularly severe economic downturn. Suppose that the quality of banks’ assets 
deteriorates in a downturn. This raises capital requirements, which forces banks to cut back on 
lending, reinforcing the downturn. As, banks are forced to reduce leverage firms’ ability to lend 
is reduced lowering their level of investment and their market value, and increasing their default 
probability. To the extent that banks are exposed to these firms declining value, their assets may 
further deteriorate. 
Figure 4.1  Quarterly Changes in Assets and Leverage of US Investment Banks (Source: Greenlaw et al., 
2008) 
 
Several potential driving forces of procyclicality exist (for an overview see Borio et al, 2001). 
First, regulation can drive procyclicality. Capital requirements are proportional to the risks on 
banks balance sheets. However, measurement difficulties may result in excessively low risk 
estimates in good times and overly high-risk estimates in bad times. Capital requirements may 
 
19 However, it is important to realize that procyclicality does not necessarily imply excessive risk taking. For example, in a 
boom the productivity of assets is high whereas the default risk is low, thus the socially efficient level of investment 
increases.   40 
induce procyclicality results if under- or overestimates are not corrected for. Fair value 
accounting can pose problems if assets’ market values no longer reflect fundamentals. This may 
happen, for example, when asset bubbles emerge, when markets freeze and become illiquid, or 
when herding causes investors to neglect fundamentals. 
Second, the informational asymmetries that lie at the root of credit rationing may result in 
procyclicality. Because the level of credit rationing inversely depends on firms’ future 
prospects, the level of credit rationing decreases during an upswing. This fuels investment and 
strengthens the upswing. During a downturn, however, the level of credit rationing increases, 
reducing investments and reinforcing the downturn. In the literature, this is known as ‘financial 
acceleration’.  
Third, in financial markets rational herding and cognitive biases may increase volatility, 
lead to greater correlations in asset portfolios, and reinforce asset bubbles. Reputation concerns 
may lead banks to rationally ride a bubble, because it may be better to fail collectively.  
4.1  Effects of regulation 
4.1.1  Capital adequacy rules 
An important rationale for capital regulation is to decrease excessive risk taking by banks. 
Capital requirements are thus proportional to the risks on banks balance sheets. In order to set 
capital correctly, regulators have to measure the risks on banks’ balance sheet. When risk 
regulation requires banks to hold a higher capital ratio during economic downswings, reflecting 
the increased potential credit losses in their portfolios, they may respond by reducing credit. 
This response reduces investment and consumption, thereby intensifying the downturn. This 
then feeds back into the banks’ balance sheets, further raising capital requirements, etc. 
These feedback mechanisms occur if some conditions are met. First, capital requirements 
should be binding, i.e., banks capital levels are not substantially above the minimum regulatory 
level, higher capital requirements then force banks to increase their capital ratios. If banks are 
forced by market discipline to hold substantially more capital than required, they will not have 
to raise capital if the regulator risk weights increase. Second, banks should be unable to meet 
these higher requirements by issuing new equity, or selling liquid assets. Only then will they 
stop extending credit. Finally, reduced bank credit does not necessarily imply that firms are cut-
off of credit. Other sources of financing, for example private equity or corporate debt markets, 
may be available. If firms are then unable to switch to such alternative sources of finance, the 
shrinking availability of bank credit will reduce investment and strengthen the recession. 
In 1988 the so-called Basel I accord was introduced which included regulations on bank 
capital. Basel I introduced a minimum capital requirement equal to 8% of banks’ risk-weighted 
total assets. Risk-weighted assets were computed by assigning to each asset category a fixed 
weight according to presumed degree of risk. In 2008 a new Basel Capital Accord was 
implemented, Basel II. Because it strengthens the link between risk exposure and capital   41 
requirement this reform of the 1988 Basel Accord has been criticized for potentially making 
bank lending more procyclical than Basel I: more risk-sensitive capital requirements will 
respond stronger to changing risks of banks’ assets. 
Under Basel II, Capital requirements can be computed using two different approaches: the 
standardised approach and the internal ratings based approach. Whether or not capital 
requirements are procyclical, depends on how the key input parameters in the two approaches 
move through the cycle. 
The Standardised Approach assigns varying risk-weights to claims on corporates, banks and 
sovereigns. However, in contrast to Basel I, it provides for greater risk-sensitivity by varying 
the weights with the external rating assessments of credit risk. This generates procyclicality if 
the weights increase in downturns, reflecting the deterioration of ratings, and decrease during 
expansions. Whether generates procyclicality depends on whether the external ratings move 
with the cycle.  
In principle, external credit ratings are measured on a `through-the-cycle' (TTC) basis 
instead of a ‘point-in-time’ (PIT) basis. The estimated probability of default should then be 
based on the probability of default in a downward scenario. The rating will only be adjusted 
when the prospects of the company or the downward scenario are changed. Hence, this type of 
rating should produce relatively stable ratings over the cycle and hence mitigate procyclicality. 
Amato and Furfine (2003) conclude that only investment grades or initial ratings of new 
established companies co-move with the business cycle.  
Second, in the Internal Rating Based (IRB) approach banks provide their own risk 
estimates.
20 In the Internal Ratings-Based approach banks have to calculate the capital 
requirement of loans based on four variables: (1) probability of default (PD)
21; (2) exposure at 
default (EAD)
22; (3) loss given default (LGD); and (4) maturity of the loan (M). The PD 
estimation induces procyclicality because default rates are strongly correlated with cyclical 
conditions. In the case of the advanced IRB approach, Basel II establishes that banks, in 
estimating the parameters relevant to capital requirements, must consider borrowers’ ability to 
repay the loan under current conditions but also in potentially adverse cyclical conditions, using 
data for long enough periods. In other words, the spirit of the regulation requires banks to 
follow a TTC estimation approach. This should in principle reduce the potential procyclical 
nature of the PD parameter. According to Panetta et al. (2009) there are some reasons why 
banks often fail to conform to this spirit, so that all these parameters may end up playing a role 
 
20 The regulatory framework recognizes two types of internal rating systems. These are the foundation approach and the 
advanced approach. At the foundation level banks only estimate the PDs while the regulator determines the other factors. At 
the advanced level a banks estimates all four parameters. 
21 Basel II specifies that the probability of default can be estimated by three different techniques: (i) banks’ internal default 
experience; (ii) statistical default models; (iii) mapping banks’ internal ratings onto external ratings. 
22 While for balance sheet items the EAD is a known value, the advanced IRB approach requires banks to estimate EAD for 
off-balance-sheet items as well. The rationale is that borrowers in trouble tend to have greater recourse to unused credit 
facilities, so that banks’ actual exposure in case of default is likely to exceed the current value of the loan (See also Allen 
and Saunders, 2003).   42 
in terms of procyclicality. First, the PIT approach is often preferred to the TTC approach 
because it is easier to implement. Furthermore PDs are not regularly updated and recalibrated 
but only when the whole system is overhauled, which tends to be associated with cyclical 
fluctuations. Segoviano and Lowe (2002) present evidence that the implementation of IRB in 
Mexico caused a cyclical movement of the bank reserves.  
As for PD, the Basel II framework requires banks to use prudent and a-cyclical LGD 
estimates. There is some evidence that collateral values and recovery rates on corporate bond 
defaults fall in economic downturns. Taylor and Goodhart (2004) argue that for the US market 
in recessions bond recovery rates may fall up to 25 percentage points from their average non-
recession value. They also argue for bank loans that recovery rates are higher in expansions and 
that the cyclical variations consist in a sharp increase of LGD in recessions, not a reduction in 
upturns. Acharya et al. (2004) conclude that industry conditions are the primary driver of 
LGDs. Nevertheless, in a recession many industries are likely to be in weak condition and a 
bank, with exposure to a range of sectors, is thus likely to experience cyclical movements in 
LGD levels.  
Finally, the dependence of capital requirements on loans’ maturity can also induce pro-
cyclical effects. During an economic downturn, exposures become de facto less liquid, because 
borrowers have trouble repaying the loans. Besides, banks tend to reschedule loans to 
counterparties in temporary difficulties but with good medium-term growth potential. Both 
effects lengthen the maturity of the loan portfolio and therefore increase capital requirements 
(See also Gordy and Howells, 2004). According to Bouvatier and Lepetit (2007) and Bikker and 
Metzemaker (2004) loan loss provision is higher when GDP growth is lower. This negative 
correlation indicates that there is procyclicality present caused by a fast growth of buffers 
during a downturn forcing banks to reduce lending.
23 Similarily, Salas and Saurina (2002) and 
Pesola (2001) find that the provisioning and quality of loans is significant positive related with 
the business cycle. 
 
4.1.2  Fair value accounting 
In response to the financial crisis, international accounting standard setters have been 
considering whether to move towards or away from uniform reporting of all financial assets at 
fair value.
24 Fair Value Accounting (FVA) involves reporting assets and liabilities on the 
balance sheet at fair value and recognizing changes in fair value as gains and losses in the 
income statement. The International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) define fair value as 
the amount for which an asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, between 
 
23 See also Cavello and Majnoni (2002), pain (2003) Arpa et al. (2003, Bikker and Hu (2002) and Laeven and Majoni (2003) 
which reach similar conclusions. 
24 The EU oriented International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), an independent and privately-funded standard setting 
body based in London, that develops the IFRS-standard and the US based Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
that develops US-GAAP standard.   43 
knowledgeable, willing parties, in an arm’s length transaction. The US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (US-GAAP) use a similar phrasing in its accounting standard IAS 39.  
When market prices are used to determine fair value, FVA is also called mark-to-market 
accounting. Note that FVA differs from pure mark-to-market accounting, where assets are 
always recorded at market value. Current accounting rules allow banks to deviate from market 
prices under certain circumstances, for example when market prices no longer reflect an assets 
fundamental value. In that case, a bank should use valuation techniques and all relevant market 
information that is available so that these valuation techniques maximize the use of observable 
inputs (IAS 39). This may imply significant adjustments to an observed price in order to arrive 
at the price at which an orderly transaction would have taken place (e.g., IASB Expert Advisory 
Panel, 2008). 
Critics of FVA argue that it increases the procyclicality of the financial sector, and thus also 
the negative externalities from individual banks’ risk choices. The main point is that market 
prices can be distorted by market inefficiencies, investor irrationality or liquidity problems, and 
that FVA causes changes in these distorted prices to be reflected immediately in banks’ balance 
sheets and profit and loss accounts.
25  
During booms FVA and asset write-ups allow banks to increase their leverage, which feeds 
back into real economic activity. The mechanism works in reverse in a downturn: the 
immediate recording of fair value reduction on assets reduces banks’ capital base, hence their 
lending and their demand for securities. As a result, the financial system becomes more 
vulnerable and financial crises more severe (see e.g., Persaud, 2008, or Panetta et al., 2009).
26 
In addition, the critics claim that FVA can lead to contagion. If a shock hits some banks, 
these may be forced to sell assets in order to recapitalize. If this induces fire sales, i.e., prices 
below the fundamental value of an asset, FVA requires other in principle healthy institutions to 
mark their assets to market. These may then be forced to sell assets as well, triggering a 
negative feedback spiral. 
Proponents of FVA argue that, while concerns about pure mark-to-market accounting in 
times of financial crisis may be legitimate, FVA as stipulated by the accounting standards IFRS 
or US GAAP allows deviations from marking-to-market precisely in those circumstances where 
this may have adverse consequences. Indeed, when fire sales occur and market prices no longer 
reflect fundamentals, banks may deviate from mark-to-market and instead mark-to-model. 
A popular alternative to FVA is Historical Cost Accounting (HCA), which uses the price 
paid for the asset at the time of its acquisition for balance sheet purposes. According to many 
banks HCA is superior to FVA. They claim that an asset’s market price does not reflect the 
expected value to the bank accurately. Historical Cost Accounting, however, comes with its 
 
25 In a world of complete and perfect markets, reporting market values of a firm’s assets would be optimal but also 
superfluous because there would be no consequences for the firm’s commercial decisions. 
26 Taylor and Goodhart (2004) list several other features of the specific way that current accountancy rules implement FVA 
may also increase financial sector procyclicality. Using market estimates of risks, treating of liabilities mostly at cost and the 
effect of changes in the valuation of goodwill.   44 
own set of problems. For instance, HCA may provide incentives engage in what is known as 
“gains trading”, i.e., selectively selling financial instruments with unrealized gains and keeping 
those with losses. Because the gains show up in the profit-and-loss statement, but the losses do 
not, this artificially inflates accounting profits. The concern about banks’ ability to engage in 
gains trading was a major impetus for introducing FVA for financial instruments (e.g., Wyatt, 
1991; Schulz and Hollister, 2003). 
As a consequence of HCA, the absence of accurate information could reduce banks’ ability 
to finance themselves in good times, if there is no credible alternative for conveying 
information about a bank’s health to the market. Moreover, as long as market prices accurately 
reflect the fundamental value of assets, lack of transparency under HCA could make matters 
worse during crises. An important factor in the freezing of the interbank market was the absence 
of information on banks’ exposure to the subprime problems. FVA may provide important 
information to the market. In addition, the absence of accurate information facilitates regulatory 
forbearance as regulators can more easily allow insolvent banks to continue operating. 
Several papers have tried to model the role of fair value accounting theoretically. Allen and 
Carletti (2008) argue that regulatory capital requirements for banks based on fair-value 
accounting measures can lead to contagion. As liquidity dries up, cash-in-the-market-pricing 
causes prices to drop below their net present value. When FVA is used, the changes in market 
prices directly affect the value of banks’ assets. This can force banks to inefficiently sell part of 
their assets at fire sale prices, or in extreme cases even lead to insolvency. Gorton, He and 
Huang (2006) study the effect of compensation schemes for traders in principal-agent 
relationships. They examine when marking-to-market is part of an optimal contract. They note 
that trader behaviour will affect prices, which in turn will affect the marked-to-market value of 
their position. Traders may then rationally herd, trading on irrelevant information, causing asset 
prices to be less informative than they would be without marking-to-market.  
Although these studies identify a market failure that can justify government intervention, 
i.e., incomplete contracts and herding, a drawback is that they do not incorporate the costs of 
alternative accounting measures such as historical cost accounting. Plantin et al. (2008) try to 
model the trade-offs between the drawbacks of HCA and those of FVA. A historical cost 
regime is insensitive to forward looking market prices. This induces inefficient sales due to 
gains trading. Marking to market uses market information, but this leads to distortions for 
illiquid assets. They argue that a historical cost regime may dominate the mark-to-market 
regime from a welfare perspective when assets have a long duration, trade in a very illiquid 
market, or feature an important downside risk.
27 
In addition, some papers try to calibrate the effect of fair value accounting. The simulation 
analysis of Enria et al. (2004) of the extension of full fair value accounting to European banks 
 
27 An interesting question is the economic rationale for government intervention in accounting rules. Why is a mandated 
disclosure rule combined with self-regulation not sufficient for obtaining an optimal accounting regime? If accounting is a 
way to credibly reveal information to investors, one might expect firms to be able to commit to optimal schemes without 
government intervention.   45 
finds the potential for pro-cyclical effects and an increase the volatility of banks’ balance 
sheets. However, they also present empirical results on the effect of introduction of the Capital 
according to which banks’ trading books should be marked-to-market. They look at five EU 
countries: France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom and find no effect on the 
volatility of banks’ equity returns. 
An important empirical question that has not been addressed yet is what role FVA has 
played in spreading the current crisis. Nevertheless, some studies have tried to measure 
empirically other effects of fair value accounting. Huizinga and Laeven (2009) show how banks 
used accounting discretion to overstate the value of their distressed assets. Banks have 
considerable discretion as regards the classification of assets, valuation techniques and the 
treatment of loan losses. Huizinga and Laeven claim that this may lead to inaccurate 
information in times of a financial crisis, which they argue may facilitate regulatory 
forbearance.  
A relevant piece of the puzzle would be that prices were at fire-sale levels and that these low 
market prices negatively affected healthy banks. Interestingly, Laux and Leuz (2009) observe 
that banks have not put forward evidence that prices were distorted during the crisis and that 
this forced them to sell assets, even though banks are in the best position to provide such 
evidence. 
The discussion on what accounting measures to use has been around for some time, and will 
be around for some time to come. An important issue, however, that deserves more attention is 
why the difference between HCA ad FVA matters at all. If the information disclosed on the 
type of assets on the balance sheet is similar, investors can figure out themselves what these 
assets would be worth under HCA or FVA. This would suggest that from the perspective of a 
bank’s financiers, the difference between the two approaches is immaterial. 
4.2  Financial acceleration 
A large (macroeconomic) literature has developed the idea that imperfections in financial 
markets can amplify the business cycle through the availability of bank credit, generally 
referred to as financial acceleration.
28 In other words, how financial markets may amplify the 
consequences and increase the persistence of shocks to the economy. 
At the hart of this connection between financial markets and the real economy lies credit 
rationing. In the seminal work of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) credit rationing arises due to adverse 
selection. Suppose that lenders face a population of borrowers with investment projects that 
differ in riskiness. Because of limited liability the borrower bears none of the downside risk. 
This implies that for a given expected return on a project a borrower’s expected payoff 
increases with increasing risk. Higher interest rates lower the net present value of both safe and 
 
28 The connection between financial markets and the real economy through banking credit gives rise to the ‘credit view’, as 
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risky projects, but the expected payoff of a borrower with a safe project becomes negative at 
lower interest rates than the payoff of a borrower with a safe project. Raising the price of a loan 
will then attract borrowers with more risky projects. Because the bank bears all the downside 
risk, the bank chooses to ration credit instead of raising interest rates. 
Alternatively, credit rationing may arise because of moral hazard (Bester and Hellwig, 
1987), because the quality of projects is unknown and can only be verified by costly state 
verification (Townsend, 1979, Williamson, 1987), or because of limited commitment 
possibilities due to the inalienability of human capital (see Tirole, 2006 or Freixas and Rochet, 
2008). 
In all these cases lenders must be compensated for the agency costs that arise due to 
asymmetric information. These agency costs introduce a wedge (“the external finance 
premium”) between the cost of funds raised externally and the opportunity cost of funds internal 
to the firm. By co-investing own funds or pledging collateral, firms can credibly signal the 
quality of their investment or internalise the costs of moral hazard. Thus, changes in the value 
of collateral, or the distribution or amount of firm capital will affect the amount of money firms 
are able to borrow. In this way, imperfections in financial markets can propagate or amplify 
shocks through the economy. 
The basic mechanism of financial acceleration is that during an economic expansion asset 
prices rise, increasing the value of available collateral and the level of pledgeable income. 
Higher collateral values and higher pledgeable income increase the availability of credit, which 
feeds back on the real economy, enhances growth and results in a further increase in asset 
prices. To the extent that borrowers' net worth is procyclical (because of the procyclicality of 
profits and asset prices, for example), the external finance premium will be countercyclical, 
enhancing the swings in borrowing and thus in investment, spending, and production. 
Several key papers that use this mechanism in some form to connect the real economy with 
financial markets are Bernanke and Gertler (1990), Carlstrom and Fuerst, (1997) and Kyotaki 
and Moore (1997). For an overview of the literature, see Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1998).  
In Bernanke and Gertler (1990), entrepreneurs need to borrow funds because they have 
insufficient own resources to finance an investment themselves. An entrepreneur can perform a 
costly evaluation of his investment project (“screen the project”) to learn how risky it is, but has 
no credible way to communicate this information to the lender. A lender is therefore faced with 
an adverse selection problem. Because borrowers are protected by limited liability, they will 
select investment projects that are too risky. How much more risky depends on the level of their 
own funds they have co-invested. As a result, in equilibrium the amount of investment spending 
and its expected return will depend on the net worth positions of borrowers.  
The model of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) adds feedback through asset prices, resulting in an 
intertemporal multiplier effect and is based on control over assets instead of costly verification 
of project returns. In their model lenders can only enforce lending contracts by their claim on 
the collateral of borrowers. Hence, the maximum amount borrowers can lend is determined by   47 
the value of their collateral, i.e., their capital goods used for production. At the same time, the 
value of collateral depends on aggregate credit supply. So in this model collateral values, 
borrowing, and output are interdependent. Any change in the value of collateral will therefore 
get amplified: a reduction in asset prices will result in less borrowing, which leads to less 
investment, reducing future income and net present value, and therefore further reducing 
investment. The mechanism works in the opposite direction during upswings. 
Thus far, however, the literature discussed does not incorporate financial intermediaries. In 
the models discussed, loans are made directly between an investor and an entrepreneur. 
Financial intermediaries, however, can reduce the scope for moral hazard by more intense 
monitoring, and thus reduce the need for collateral. Because monitoring is a partial substitute 
for collateral, incorporating financial intermediaries into the analysis will affect the way in 
which shocks propagate from the financial to the real sector and vice versa.  
One of the few contributions that study the relation between financial markets and the real 
economy that does include financial intermediation is Holmström and Tirole (1997). They 
present a static model where both the borrowing capacity of firms and the monitoring capacity 
of financial intermediaries are limited because of moral hazard. Hence a redistribution of capital 
across firms, intermediaries and uninformed investors will impact investment, monitoring and 
interest rates.
29 They investigate the effect of an exogenous shock to monitoring capital, firm 
capital or investment capital on investment, monitoring and interest rates. In future analysis this 
type of model will be important in linking the real sector with financial markets. Because of the 
static nature of their model, however, they can not address propagation or feedback 
mechanisms.  
4.3  Cognitive biases, herding and bubbles 
4.3.1  Cognitive biases 
Cognitive biases are psychological phenomena that refer to systematic errors that people make 
in the intuitive judgment of probability. Some of these biases can enhance the procyclicality in 
the financial system. The most relevant biases for procyclicality are disaster myopia, cognitive 
dissonance and overconfidence.  
Disaster myopia refers to the way in which people estimate probability of events that are 
unlikely to occur (Bazerman, 2002). In general, research shows that people tend to 
underestimate the probability of such events occurring, and when they have occurred recently, 
to overestimate this probability. As a result, the longer time has passed since the last recession, 
the more likely people will underestimate the probability of a new recession. As a result of 
disaster myopia, financial markets may become euphoric when capital gains have persisted for 
quite some time. People may then expect future capital gains as well, and may start looking 
 
29 Peek and Rosengren (2000) study empirically how shocks to the Japanese banking sector lead to a loan supply shock in 
US markets. They link that shock to construction activity in US commercial real estate market.    48 
more for short-term capital gains instead of long-term income from assets (Kindleberger, 1996). 
This will draw more funds to asset markets and increase their prices 
Cognitive dissonance refers to the tendency of people to look for confirmation of beliefs that 
already had (Borio, et al., 2001). This can reinforce procyclicality as people will interpret 
information in a way that ascertains their beliefs about the sustainability of expansions. 
Overconfidence refers to the tendency of people to overestimate their own abilities. For 
instance, more than 90% of traders thought they were in the top 50% of earning of that group 
(Camerer, 1989). Together these biases can result in too low risk perception by loan officers, 
too optimistic views on the future and too high asset prices.  
4.3.2  Herding 
Managers of companies, banks, or mutual funds may be susceptible to herding. Herding occurs 
if managers base their investment decisions on what others do rather than on fundamental value 
of assets. Managers may avoid innovating because staying with the herd results in a more 
reliable performance measure. They may neglect private information because they are unsure 
about its value, while they observe other agents making different choices. In general, herding 
gives rise to inefficient investment decisions. In financial markets it may increase volatility, 
lead to greater correlations in asset portfolios and reinforce asset bubbles. In this way, it may 
contribute to systemic risk. 
Theories of herding can be divided in two types: those involving irrational agents, and those 
involving rational agents, see Bikhchandani and Sharma (2001) for a survey of the literature 
with applications to financial markets.
30 
Different theories of rational herding exist. First, herding can occur due to so-called 
information cascades. In this case, agents have private but imperfect information about the 
correct course of action, and gain useful information from observing previous decisions by 
other agents. In this setting, herd behaviour may arise if the updating of their beliefs leads 
agents to base their decisions on the information suggested by other agent’s actions instead of 
their own private information (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992; 
Welch, 1992). Once a cascade starts, an individual’s action does not reflect her private 
information anymore. Consequently, once a cascade starts, the private information of 
subsequent investors is never included in the public pool of knowledge. Instead, individuals, 
acting in their own self-interest, rationally take uninformative imitative actions. Such behaviour 
is fragile, in that it may break easily with the arrival of a little new information. It is also 
idiosyncratic, in that random events combined with the choices of the first few players 
determine the type of behaviour on which individuals herd (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer and 
Welch, 1998). 
 
30 See Devenow and Welch (1996) for an earlier review. We will not discuss theories that explain herding from irrational 
behaviour by investors. These have been partly addressed under the header ‘cognitive biases’.   49 
Second, herding can arise if agents are rewarded according to their relative performance. This 
reward can be explicit, for example, due to relative performance contracts. The reward can also 
be implicit, for example, if an agent’s reputation depends on performance relative to other 
agents. A relative performance contract can be optimal for the principal (the employer of the 
agent) when there is moral hazard or adverse selection. However, such a contract can make it 
attractive for managers with low abilities to ‘hide in the herd’ (Maug and Naik, 1996; Admati 
and Pfleiderer, 1997). Reputation concerns lead to herding in a similar way (Scharfstein and 
Stein, 1990; Trueman, 1994; Zwiebel, 1995; Prendergast and Stole, 1996; Graham, 1999).  
Let us briefly discuss two important contributions. In Scharfstein and Stein (1990) a 
manager may have low or high ability. Neither the manager nor his employer knows this ex 
ante. High ability managers receive informative signals about a project’s value. Low ability 
managers receive random signals. Because managers do not know their own type, they have an 
incentive to mimic each other. In Zwiebel (1995), managers have to decide whether to innovate 
or not. Managers know their own ability, but investors do not. If only few managers are able to 
innovate, sticking with the old technology results in a more reliable benchmark for performance 
evaluation. Managers with low or high ability choose to innovate, because low ability managers 
have nothing to lose and gamble for resurrection, whilst high ability managers are able to show 
their capabilities anyway. Managers with average ability, however, do not innovate because 
they gain most from a reliable performance evaluation: they have more to lose from downward 
risk than to gain from upward risk. 
A substantial empirical literature on herding behaviour also exists. Hong, Kubik, and 
Solomon (2000), find that young analysts are more likely than their older counterparts to leave 
the profession following poor forecast accuracy and bold forecasts. Moreover, they find that 
young analysts are less bold than their older counterparts, consistent with the predictions of 
reputation based herding models. Chevalier and Ellison (1999) find similar results for mutual 
fund managers. Welch (2000) finds that inexperienced analysts are more likely to have their 
employment terminated as a result of inaccurate earnings forecasts than are their more 
experienced counterparts. Controlling for forecast accuracy, they are also more likely to be 
terminated for bold forecasts that deviate from the consensus. Consistent with these implicit 
incentives, inexperienced analysts deviate less from consensus forecasts. Additionally, 
inexperienced analysts are less likely to issue timely forecasts and they revise their forecasts 
more frequently. These findings are broadly consistent with existing career concern motivated 
herding theories. 
Rajan (1994) develops a theory of bank herding based on reputation concerns that explains 
why bank credit policies fluctuate procyclically. If an adverse shock hits the whole sector, a 
banks reputation is less likely to suffer. A bank's reputation is therefore less sensitive to poor 
earnings when other banks also admit to poor earnings. This creates an incentive to herd. 
Acharya and Yorulmazer (2009) develop a theory of bank herding based on performance 
benchmarking. When banks invest in the same industry, the financiers of the banks can not   50 
distinguish whether performance is due to a systematic shock or due to good performance. 
When banks invest in different industries, benchmarking results in information about 
performance. Again, this creates an incentive to herd. 
4.3.3  Asset price bubbles 
The data show that financial crises are not rare phenomena, but occur relatively regularly.
31 
Empirical studies comparing different financial crises show very similar patterns in the run-up 
to a crisis. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) study crises in 20 countries: 5 industrial and 15 
emerging ones. They find that financial liberalisation and significant credit expansion preceded 
most crises, followed by an average rise in the price of shares of about 40% per year above that 
occurring in normal times. The prices of real estate and other assets also increased significantly.  
At some point the bubble bursts and share and real estate markets collapse. The bursting of 
bubbles is usually accompanied by an increase in non-performing loans, credit losses, and acute 
liquidity problems within the interbank market. Typically, banks and other financial 
intermediaries are overexposed to the equity and real estate markets and on average about a 
year later a banking crisis ensues.   
Thus, bubbles are a common precursor to a financial crisis. Also the current crisis was 
preceded by a bubble in the US real estate market. Economists use different definitions of a 
bubble. The common element is that asset or output prices increase at a rate that is greater than 
can be explained by market fundamentals. In other words, a bubble implies that an asset’s price 
cannot be justified by the value of dividends that society expects to earn from this asset class 
collectively.
32 
Broadly speaking, two approaches to bubbles exist (Camerer, 1989). The first maintains 
rational expectations. Asset prices contain a bubble if investors are willing to pay more for the 
asset than they know is justified by the value of the discounted expected future cash flows 
because they expect they will be able to sell it at an even higher price in the future. Importantly, 
the pricing is still rational and there are no arbitrage opportunities. In an expanding bubble asset 
prices can consist of two components: the intrinsic value and a bubble component. To be 
consistent with rational expectations, this bubble component has to grow exponentially at the 
discount rate (Blanchard and Watson, 1982).  
Tirole (1982) showed under which circumstances rational bubbles can be ruled out: if 
traders start out with a common set of beliefs, it is common knowledge that all traders are 
rational and that resources are allocated efficiently prior to trading. Rational bubbles can only 
arise if one of these conditions is violated. 
 
31 Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) report that over the past two centuries, the 66 countries they study have experienced 286 
banking crises, 105 of which have come since 1945. On average, countries have been in crisis for roughly one year out of 
every 12. 
32 In popular use a bubble often describes a situation in which the price of an asset increases significantly in a short time and 
becomes prone to sudden collapse. Some economists also use this definition, for example, Kindleberger (1996, p.13) 
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Empirically investigating rational bubbles and discriminating between competing hypotheses is 
difficult. In surveying the literature, Gürkaynak (2008) concludes that “bubble tests do not do a 
good job of differentiating between misspecified fundamentals and bubbles”. 
A complementary literature describes bubbles as driven by irrational, or non-rational, 
expectations. This is also the way in which the term bubble is commonly used in the popular 
press. For example, in December 1996 Alan Greenspan famously used the term "irrational 
exuberance" to describe what he thought drove share prices during the stock market boom of 
the 1990s. 
As we have argued above, people tend to be overconfident in their own abilities, hence the 
majority of the people may believe that they can benefit from a bubble, because they believe 
they can sell in time and so will not be ‘the one stuck with the hot potato’. It is clearly not 
possible for everyone to leave the bubble before it bursts. One argument against the 
development of such bubbles may be that ‘rational’ investors can bet against them. However, it 
may be difficult to bet against these bubbles, if other agents are unpredictable, because the 
unpredictability leads to uncertainty as to when the bubble is going to burst, which reduces the 




33 For instance, margins will have to increase when prices rise further. Given the limited availability of funds this may 
become binding, and may even lead to a forced reversal of short positions, at a high loss. As Keynes said, ”The market can 
stay irrational longer than you can stay liquid.”   52   53 
5  Regulation 
The benefits of creating systemic risk accrue privately, but the costs of a crisis are borne 
socially. This disparity makes regulation of systemic risk necessary. We divide policy measures 
that aim to reduce systemic risk into three broad categories: incentive regulation, structural 
regulation, and ex post crisis intervention.
34  
Incentive regulation tries to change the incentives of financial intermediaries so that they 
internalise the external effects of their risk taking. Ex ante price regulation, as it is sometimes 
referred to, can take the form of taxation, capital requirements, insurance. Policymakers can 
also change banks’ incentives by giving banks’ financiers stronger incentives to discipline 
banks, i.e., by increasing market discipline. 
Structural regulation tries to limit systemic risk through quantity regulation, such as putting 
quantitative restrictions on bank characteristics that are thought to be related to systemic risk or 
limiting the activities that banks are allowed to perform, and structural measures, such as 
regulation rating agencies, increasing the transparency of markets, or reducing competition. 
Finally, ex post crisis intervention tries to dampen the mechanisms that spread problems 
once a crisis occurs. It includes the lender of last resort function o central banks, deposit 
insurance, bank-specific bankruptcy rules, contingency plans such as living wills, and prompt 
corrective action. 
Of course, a particular policy measures may belong to different categories, depending on its 
exact nature.  For example, measures that fall in the category ‘ex post crisis intervention’ often 
have ex ante effects. Deposit insurance increases moral hazard; deposit insurance with a risk-
adjusted insurance premium is also a form of incentive regulation; and prompt corrective action 
aims to provide incentives ex ante by forcing banks to take costly action when certain indicators 
cross pre-determined thresholds. For expositional purposes, however, we put these policy 
measures in one category. 
For each type of measure, we discuss the issues that might hamper its effectiveness in 
reducing systemic risk. Table 5.1 summarises the regulatory measures and corresponding issues 
discussed in this section. 
 
 
34 Other categorisations are of course also possible.   54 
Table 5.1  Policy measures to address systemic risk 
Type  Measure  Issues 
     
Incentive regulation  Taxation   Calibration, Politicians’ opportunism, industry lobbying     
  Capital requirements  Calibration, one instrument with too many goals, regulatory 
capture, limited scope   
  Insurance premium  Calibration, pricing incentives, payout trigger, moral hazard 
  Market discipline   Irrational market behaviour, implicit governments guarantees  
     
Structural regulation  Portfolio restrictions  Loss of economies of scope, gaming of regulation 
   Quantity regulation  Inefficiencies, triggers risk shifting  
  Product standardisation     Gaming of regulation, increased cost of tailored products  
  Increased transparency  Treatment of non-standard contracts, central counterparty risk,  
     
Ex post crisis intervention  Lender of last resort  Pricing of liquidity, distinguishing illiquidity from insolvency, 
moral hazard, regulatory forbearance  
  Deposit insurance  Pricing, moral hazard, implicit government guarantees, role of 
private insurers 
  Prompt corrective action  Regulatory capture, time-inconsistency problem, trigger-levels  
  Living will  Implicit government guarantees, international coordination, 
trigger variable  
  Bank-specific bankruptcy 
laws 
Treatment counterparty risk, distinguishing good and bad 
assets, credibility, international coordination  
 
5.1  Four generic problems 
Regulation of systemic risk has to deal with four generic problems: the measurement and 
pricing of systemic risk, the strategic reaction of market participant to new regulation, the fact 
that regulators are also subject to principal-agent problems, and governments that lack 
commitment and have to weigh ex ante discipline against ex post safety. 
Quantifying and pricing systemic risk 
In general, for many policy measures it is not only necessary to quantify systemic risk, but also 
to put a price tag on particular levels of systemic risk. Because of several reasons, however, 
systemic risk is inherently difficult to quantify.  
First, measurement of systemic externalities is difficult because the externalities have to be 
measured in normal times, but their detrimental effect only materializes under extreme 
circumstances. How much more likely becomes the failure of bank B, if bank A takes on more 
risk? Take, for example, the measurement of interconnectedness. To quantify the 
interconnectedness detailed information about banks’ exposures and banks’ assets, both on- and 
off balance sheet.  
Second, the external effects of an individual bank’s risk taking may depend on 
characteristics of the financial system as a whole, which are much harder to observe that those 
of individual banks. Take again the example of interconnectedness, here not only the number of 
interconnections matters, but also the specific structure of the network connecting banks. Are   55 
all banks connected in one big cluster or are there several clusters with key bottleneck banks 
connecting the different clusters? Or consider liquidity risk .The liquidity risk of a particular 
funding structure depends on how liquid assets are. If assets are sold easily, such as treasury 
bills, maturity mismatch is not a problem. As we have seen in the current crisis, however, assets 
can suddenly switches from being liquid to being illiquid. See section 3.2 for several potential 
explanations of such a ‘market freeze’. 
Third, a calibration of government policies that try to price external effects also requires a 
quantification of the effect of a collective failure of banks. To put the correct price on a bank’s 
contribution to systemic risk, we should know by how much the probability of a crisis increases 
as a result of this bank’s contribution, as well as the costs of this crisis. But interconnectedness, 
short-term funding and complex tailor-made financial products also have benefits. Short-term 
funding gives creditors an incentive to monitor and diversification of risk is beneficial. This 
means that setting a wrong price will be costly. 
All this implies that one should be cautious of policy measures that require a precise 
measurement of systemic risk or systemic externalities. Nevertheless, it is important to identify 
indicators of systemic risk. Building upon the mechanisms of contagion we’ve identified, 
indicators should include: the level of interconnectedness, the potential for information 
spillovers, the risk of liquidity problems arising, and the potential for procyclical effects when 
bank capital is hit. This requires detailed information on exposure to other financial 
intermediaries through the interbank market, the direct contracts with other banks, and 
insurance contracts such as credit default swaps, the type of assets banks hold on their balance 
sheets, the duration of bank assets and liabilities and on the loans that banks extend to firms.
35  
Regulatory gaming 
A second obstacle is the incentive for banks to evade regulation meant to reduce systemic risk. 
Such regulation taxes the originators of risks for their contribution to systemic risk. Evading 
such a tax is of course profitable because it allows banks to take on additional risk at the 
expense of other banks and, ultimately, the taxpayers. The information asymmetry between 
regulator and regulated is already huge for regulation of idiosyncratic risk, which requires 
information on the riskiness of individual banks’ loan portfolios. It will be even larger in case of 
systemic risk, which requires more complex information. This implies that policymakers should 
look for policy measures that are hard to circumvent. Market based measures of systemic 
externalities would help in reducing the scope for gaming regulation. 
Regulatory forbearance 
A third issue is regulatory forbearance. It is hard to give the regulator incentives to intervene in 
a timely manner. Regulators may be tempted to gamble for resurrection because of their limited 
 
35 For example, in Belgium or Sweden, banks register their loans in a central credit registry. This type of information would 
allow governments to analyse of the potential spillover effects when banks’ capital is hit.   56 
liability or lured into inactivity by reputation concerns.  When a regulator spots an incipient 
crisis, it weighs the private benefits and costs of intervening against the benefits and costs of not 
intervening. If these private benefits do not coincide with social welfare, the probability arises 
that a regulator will either intervene too late or too early.  
Several mechanisms may play a role in distorting a regulator’s incentives to intervene. First, in 
order to provide banks with ex ante incentives to be sufficiently prudent, regulators will have to 
intervene harshly, even if ex post this might seem undesirable. Regulators may find it hard to 
commit to such a policy. Second, regulators are prone to forbearance when it comes to systemic 
risk. When a regulator spots an incipient crisis, he has to decide whether or not and how to 
intervene. When making this decision, the regulator weighs the private benefits of intervention 
against the private benefits of non-intervention. These private benefits do not necessarily 
coincide with the public benefits of intervention. Limited liability, career concerns and herding 
incentives may distort a regulator’s decisions. If the downside of non intervention for a 
regulator is limited (i.e., there is limited liability), for example because he can not be fired, but a 
substantial upside exists due to career opportunities in the financial sector, then a regulator may 
be prone to forbearance. Alternatively, intervening when a bank runs into trouble may increase 
create information about a regulator’s ability to monitor banks. If a regulator can influence the 
market’s perception on his capabilities, reputation concerns may give an incentive to postpone 
intervention. By doing so, the regulator obscures his inaptitude at monitoring, which improves 
his reputation (Boot and Thakor, 1992). Finally, regulators may have an incentive to herd if 
their performance is judged against the performance of other regulators. Deviating from other 
regulators’ point of view then increases the probability of getting a bad reputation. 
Careful design of institutions and giving market information a role disciplining regulators can 
help in addressing regulatory forbearance. It is important to further investigate in more detail 
the incentives that regulators have to intervene when a crisis threatens to disrupt the financial 
sector, as well as the potentially beneficial role of market information and institutional design 
Time-inconsistency problem 
A final point is governments’ time-inconsistency problem. Time-inconsistency problems arise 
when policymakers have to weigh ex ante against ex post efficiency of their decisions and are 
unable to commit themselves to a particular course of action. In case of the financial sector, 
governments want to discipline banks ex ante, but prevent a systemic crisis ex post. There exists 
a trade-off between these two goals: bailing out banks in times of a crisis reduces ex ante 
discipline. If the government ultimately bears systemic risk, banks have an incentive to take 
such risks as they benefit from the upside, but do not suffer when the downside materializes.  
If governments cannot commit themselves, they will choose too little ex ante discipline and too 
much ex post guarantees. As a result, the government’s time-inconsistency problem creates a 
private benefit from becoming too systemic to fail. Systemic risk is therefore some extent 
created by the inability of governments to commit not to bail out systemic institutions. Policies   57 
that force banks to internalise the external effects of their risk taking decisions or rules that tie 
regulators’ hands can reduce this problem. 
5.2  Incentive regulation  
Because banks do not take into account the effect of their risk taking on other banks, they take 
on too much systemic risk. When choosing a particular proportion of short-term debt, arranging 
insurance against liquidity shocks, or deciding on leverage, a bank takes into account its private 
benefits but not the social costs. As a result, they become too dependent on short-term funding, 
grow too big, inefficiently interconnected, or too levered. 
Regulation, by putting a price on individual banks’ contribution to systemic risk, forces 
banks to internalise their contribution to systemic risk and provides incentives to choose the 
socially optimal level of risk. Policy focuses on proxies for a bank’s contribution to systemic 
risk such as size, interconnections, complexity, maturity mismatch, leverage, and heterogeneity. 
These also follow from the theory presented in section 3. The proposals to bring banks 
incentives more in line with social welfare take the form of taxation, capital requirements, 
insurance premia, and increased market discipline.  
5.2.1  Taxation 
Governments can also try to tax financial intermediaries in proportion to their contribution the 
systemic externality. In theory the size of the externality could be determined for each 
individual institution using quantitative empirical and theoretical models. All institutions that 
contribute to systemic risk should be subject to the tax. The list of the institutions that are 
subject to the tax  has to be under constant review. Revenue from taxes would add to 
government budget. This makes taxes subject to political lobbying by banks, but also to 
politicians’ opportunistic behaviour. 
5.2.2  Capital requirements 
When capital requirements are used to change banks’ incentives, the money accumulated under 
such regulation accrues to banks. It thus stays within the financial sector. This implies there are 
fewer distortions from taxation due to inefficient government spending. Also, an independent 
regulator sets capital requirements. If the regulatory framework is properly designed, this makes 
capital requirements less sensitive to lobbying by banks. Current policy proposals range from 
making banks’ capital requirements dependent on liquidity risk, leverage, size, complexity of 
banks balance sheets, the business cycle, expected or forecasted losses on loans, and 
interconnectedness.  
For example, Brunnermeier et al. (2009) propose to reduce liquidity risk by imposing a 
capital charge based upon the risk implied by the combination of an asset and the way it is 
funded. If two banks hold the same asset, the one funding the asset with long-term debt should   58 
set aside a lower amount of capital than the one funding the assets with overnight borrowing 
from the money markets. If funding markets dried up for three months, the short-term funded 
bank would be in difficulty and would be forced to sell assets. The resulting fire sales would 
worsen the liquidity and solvency environment for its competitors. 
One issue is that capital requirements serve multiple purposes: to act as a buffer as well as to 
reduce risk-taking incentives in multiple dimensions: interconnectedness, liquidity risk, 
leverage, size etc. Simultaneously achieving these goals will lead to a highly complex and non-
transparent system of capital requirements, which is prone to manipulation, constant re-
interpretation and forbearance. A second issue is that capital requirements apply to banks, while 
non-banks can also contribute to systemic risk.  
Counter-cyclical capital requirements and forward-looking loss provisioning can help in 
addressing procyclicality. Two types of loss provision can be distinguished: “expected loss 
provisioning” and “dynamic provisioning”.
36 With expected loss reserves, banks are allowed to 
make reserves for expected losses over the lifetime of loans. Thus, expected loss-provisioning 
holds for a portfolio of loans in the long run. In case of dynamic provisioning, banks have to 
make general loss provisions in good times when credit growth is above trend and credit risk 
increases (but is not materializing yet). These general provisions can then be used as a buffer to 
absorb losses when losses materialize. A disadvantage is that this penalizes efficient banks with 
above average credit growth. 
Counter-cyclical capital requirements are raised during an upswing and  slackened in a 
downturn. The reasoning is that the extra buffer built up in good times can be used in bad times. 
This way asset price and credit bubbles can be dampened, while equity cushions are created for 
the downswing (Calomiris, 2009). Important issues are: how to measure the cycle; the exact 
way in which capital requirements should depend on the cycle; and how to differentiate 
between banks, countries, and regions. 
Countercyclical capital requirements should be based on an objective cycle measure to prevent 
regulatory forbearance. Regulators may face intense lobbying from the industry if they have too 
much discretion in setting the level of capital requirements. The simplest form is to multiply 
capital requirements by some factor that depends on the cycle. This requires that there be a clear 
relationship between the measure and procyclicality of the financial system. Proposed measures 
depend on output (Repullo, et al., 2009), credit or asset price growth (Brunnermeier et al.,2009; 
Goodhart and Presaud, 2008; Davis and Karim, 2009) or some index that measures financial 
instability. 
Since cycles are not identical across countries, another issue is whether the adjustments 
should be the same for all banks in a single country (or region) or whether the measures should 
be differentiated per bank or per asset class. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) argue that such 
measures should be applied on a country-by-country basis, and that coordination in the EU may 
 
36 Under current accounting standards banks can only make provisions for losses when loan losses are inherent and both 
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be advisable. In addition, a measure based on the banks’ own credit growth will punishes 
efficient banks (Panetta, et al, 2009). This problem does not occur when capital requirements 
depend on country-level credit and asset price growth. 
5.2.3  Insurance  
An addition route for recapitalisation is to require banks to buy capital insurance in good times 
that pays out in case of a systemic crisis. An advantage of insurance is that a bank does not have 
to hold additional capital at all times to protect against major shocks. However, the amount of 
assets an insurer of systemic risk has to hold will be very large. These assets should therefore be 
very liquid, as they would have to be sold during a systemic crisis. Insurance can be either via 
the private sector or governments. Private insurers capacity to pay out will be more limited than 
that of governments. In addition, private insurers may not be interested because such insurance 
provides little scope for diversification. 
Pricing may also be problematic because the events are rare and therefore difficult to 
forecast. In addition, the insurers need incentives to price risk correctly. If the government 
remains in the background as a lender of last resort for the insurer, these incentives will suffer. 
An advantage if the government underwrites the insurance is that it can tap into capital markets 
cheaply in times of crisis to raise the necessary funds at the relatively low interest rates 
government bonds. 
Kashyap et al. (2008) propose that a private insurer should provide insurance against a 
systemic crisis. The policy would pay out upon the occurrence of a ‘banking systemic event’, 
for which the trigger would be some measure of aggregate write-offs of major financial 
institutions over a year-long period. Long-term policies would be hard to price and therefore a 
number of overlapping short-term policies maturing at different dates are proposed. 
Under the proposal by Caballero and Kurlat (2009) the central bank would issue tradable 
insurance credits, which would allow holders to attach a central bank guarantee to assets on 
their balance sheet during a systemic crisis. For a fee, the holders of these credits will have 
access to insurance for their assets during a financial crisis. The tradable insurance credits are 
like credit default swaps during a crisis, but not during normal times. They protect the holders 
in case of a systemic crisis, but not against idiosyncratic risks in normal times. This lowers the 
cost for insurance. A threshold level or trigger for systemic panic would be determined by the 
central bank.  
Perotti and Suarez (2009) call for introduction of liquidity insurance charges to force banks to 
internalise the negative systemic effects of fragile funding strategies. Regulation should levy 
charges based on banks’ funding structure as a simple proxy for the banks contribution to 
systemic risk. More specifically, banks should pay a Pigouvian tax that is determined by 
weighing its liabilities according to their maturity. The regulator could adjust these weights in 
response to aggregate risk accumulation, such as the aggregate leverage or the amount of credit 
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5.2.4  Market discipline 
In the context of this study, market discipline refers to the role of market participants in actively 
monitoring and controlling risk taking by financial intermediaries. For market discipline to be 
effective, market participants must have an incentive to monitor. That is, the financiers of 
banks, i.e., the holders of unsecured debt and equity, should have something at stake when they 
invest their money in a bank. When banks run into trouble, market discipline thus requires that 
creditors and shareholders absorb some of the losses before the taxpayer does. 
Contingent capital forms an important ingredient of improved market discipline. These debt 
conversion proposals require banks to hold some type of financial instrument ex ante that 
converts into equity when some indicator of the bank’s health reaches a pre-specified level. 
This prevents them from becoming undercapitalised without having to raise capital ratios ex 
ante. It improves market discipline by transferring losses to creditors when the equity ratio of a 
bank falls low.  
An advantage of debt instruments is that they are simple and liquid (these securities could be 
traded and priced through markets) which may keep transaction costs low. The market price of 
subordinated debt may be useful as a potential signal of a bank solvency. To ensure that 
financial institution use this type of debt, regulators could either force them to issue such claims 
or give them incentives to do so. One way to give such incentives is to allow reverse convertible 
bonds more favourable conditions in capital requirements. 
Flannery (2005, 2009) proposes to introduce so-called Reverse Convertible Debentures. 
These are debt certificates that pay a fixed payment to its holders but convert into common 
equity when a bank’s market capital ratio falls below some pre-specified level. To prevent 
manipulation and forbearance, using a capital ratio based on accounting principles should be 
avoided. Instead, the ratio should be measured using current share prices. They convert at the 
share’s current market price rather than at a predetermined price. This forces shareholders to 
internalise a larger fraction of the cost of their risk taking. This proposal has a potential 
shortcoming. It is relatively lenient towards management because it eliminates one of the 
disciplinary effects of debt (debtholders intervening in management). It can therefore give the 
manager the perverse incentive of talking down the stock so as to obtain more slack. 
However, during the 2007-2008 crisis existing going-concern capital instruments such as 
subordinated debt and hybrid capital largely failed to bear losses. This may have had two 
reasons. First, banks may have been counting on implicit government guarantees. The 
effectiveness of market discipline is strongly reduced by governments’ implicit guarantees to 
banks’ creditors. Thus, a properly designed ex post bankruptcy regime is crucial to increasing 
market discipline as a way to curb banks incentives to take on excessive risk. We will discuss 
this separately below. 
Second, because of their limited liability, banks might have been gamble for resurrection 
and convert too late. The choice to convert should therefore not be left to banks themselves. An 
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specific measures or system wide triggers. In addition, triggers can be based either on a rule or 
discretion by a regulatory body. Where rule-based triggers prevent regulatory forbearance and 
create transparency, discretion-based triggers prevent irrational market behaviour to falsely 
trigger con version. 
Regarding the institution specific conditions it is generally agreed that it should be some 
measure of capital adequacy, but the issue is whether this should be based on market measures 
or book value measures. The former gives the more timely information, but is subject to market 
inefficiencies (like fires sales), while the latter may suffer from ‘creative accounting’ and allow 
more scope for regulatory forbearance. Rajan (2009) argues that to trigger debt conversion the 
system must be in crisis, and banks’ capital has to fall below a certain level. The first is to 
ensure that inefficiently run banks cannot avoid the disciplinary power of debt. The second is to 
give banks an incentive to stay well capitalized as that prevents conversion and dilution of 
capital.  
5.3  Structural regulation 
Structural regulation tries to limit systemic risk through quantity regulation, such as putting 
quantitative restrictions on bank characteristics that are thought to be related to systemic risk or 
limiting the activities that banks are allowed to perform, and structural measures, such as 
regulation rating agencies, increasing the transparency of markets, or reducing competition. 
5.3.1  Quantity regulation 
Quantity regulation addresses the external effects of maturity mismatch, leverage, 
interconnectedness, size and business models by imposing direct limits on banks. For example, 
a leverage restriction restricts banks leverage ratio to be smaller than a  particular number.
37 
Previous to the crisis, some countries already enforced a maximum leverage ratio. For example 
Canada had a maximum leverage ratio of 20:1, whereas the US applied a leverage restriction to 
the assets of bank holding companies, but exempted investment banks from its coverage. 
There are several arguments in favour of quantity regulation. First, risk-based capital 
requirements have difficulties taking into account the extreme tail-events of a systemic crisis. 
Quantitative restrictions may help to put an upper limit on potential spillovers in case of a crisis. 
In addition, in good times quantitative constraints may prevent a build-up of risks that make the 
financial system vulnerable to bubbles and to shocks. Second, calculating capital requirements 
based on internal models entails significant judgement, and there will always be dangers that 
debates between bank management and regulators might result in too lenient a treatment. 
Quantitative restrictions work as a safeguard against regulatory concessions. Finally, an 
important advantage of this approach is its simplicity. There is no need for intricate calculations 
 
37 In general, a bank’s leverage ratio is defined as its tier I capital as a percentage of total adjusted capital, which includes 
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of weighted risks that figure price regulation such as taxation, capital requirements and 
insurance premia. The simplicity of the application and monitoring of such restrictions enables 
quick adoption without imposing high costs or expertise requirements on banks or their 
supervisors. 
A common criticism a quantitative constraints is that they do not correct for the risk of 
different assets. A simple restriction ignores finely granulated risk measures such as developed 
under Basel II. Thus, quantitative restrictions are bound to be inefficient. In addition, because 
quantitative restrictions do not distinguish between the risks of different types of bank assets, 
they may induce risk-shifting both within financial institutions, but also to less intensely 
regulated parts of the financial system. 
A second disadvantage of a leverage restriction is its reliance on an accounting framework. 
Differences in accounting consolidation and asset recognition rules can make it difficult to 
compare the leverage ratio across jurisdictions. In the absence of a uniform application of the 
ratio, there can be considerable scope for competitive advantages to banks that are mandated 
lighter leverage ratios by their domestic regulators. These differences facilitate cross-border 
regulatory arbitrage. 
5.3.2  Portfolio restrictions 
The maturity mismatch between short-term liabilities and the illiquid and risky long-term loans 
makes banks vulnerable to bank-runs. Portfolio restrictions aim to increase the stability of the 
banking system, by partitioning the financial system into safe banks, whose activities are 
restricted, and risky banks, who are allowed to perform other activities
38. In this way, 
governments could credibly commit not to bail out risky banks, increasing market discipline, 
while at the same time ring fencing crucial parts of the financial system.  
Under narrow banking proposals, banks can only use the deposits they collect to purchase 
riskless financial securities. This would solve the problem of contagious bank runs, as banks 
would always be able to honour their liabilities. A less intrusive restriction is to separate 
investment banking from other types of banking. Such portfolio restrictions have been in place 
in the US. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which was repealed in 1999, separated banks into 
investment banks and commercial banks.
39 Commercial banks were allowed to underwrite 
 
38 Nobel Prize winners Irving Fisher (1935), Milton Friedman (1959) and James Tobin (1985) have all advocated the 
establishment of narrow banks (also know as 100% reserve banking) to enhance the safety of the payments system and 
eliminate the costs associated with the present system of federal deposit insurance. Going even further back, in the Wealth 
of Nations, Adam Smith (1789, bk. 2, chap. 2) urged bankers to match the maturity structures of their assets and liabilities. 
39 Separating commercial from investment banking does not solve the problem of bank runs, for commercial banks will still 
lend short and borrow long. The act was instigated because of fears that (1) combining investment and commercial banking 
functions would create significant conflicts of interest and (2) direct involvement of commercial banks in the securities 
business would increase the riskiness of banks and the financial system. Another rationale may be that separate commercial 
banks are more transparent, and therefore easier to regulate (“what can you do wrong with simple loans and deposits”)? 
Kroszner en Rajan (1994) find no empirical that commercial bank securities affiliates systematically fooled the public before 
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government securities, but were not allowed to underwrite corporate securities, or to engage in 
brokerage activities. 
Proposals on narrow banking differ in the degree of restriction placed on the types of asset 
that narrow banks should be permitted to hold. Proposals vary from introducing a 100 percent 
reserve requirement that bound banks to fully back transaction accounts with marketable short-
term Treasury debt (Kareken 1986, Spong 1991, Mishkin 1999, Thomas 2000), to requiring 
banks to invest fully insured deposits only in high-grade securities including government paper 
or government-guaranteed securities of various maturity (Litan 1987, Herring and Litan 1995). 
Another proposal allows banks to use insured checkable deposits for short-term lending to 
consumers and businesses (Pierce 1991). So far, however, no practical experience with these 
forms of pure narrow banking exists. Discussions on the costs and benefits of narrow banking 
therefore remain theoretical. 
Narrow banking has several potential advantages (Bossone, 2001). First and most important, 
by locking bank assets in high-quality instruments, narrow-banking regulation would minimize 
banks' liquidity and credit risks. Second, confidence in the value of their claims used to make 
payments could not be weakened by changes in the value of loans. Third, if payment system 
access were restricted to narrow banks, payments would be fully secure: any shock to the 
financial system would be isolated from the payment system (Burnham, 1990; Thomas, 2000). 
Fourth, narrow banking improves the central bank's ability to control the money supply process. 
Nonbank financial intermediaries would be allowed to engage in all types of financial activities 
using non-guaranteed funds. They should be allowed to fail and are subject to market discipline.  
However, narrow banking also has potential drawbacks. The history of a depositor provides 
valuable non-tradable information on the riskiness of that depositor as a borrower. These 
economies of scope would be lost when separating the two functions (Fama, 1985).
40 
Empirically, it is unclear whether such costs outweigh potential benefits of narrow banking. 
In addition, it is questionable how effective such a separation would be in terms of reducing 
systemic risk. Under narrow banking, maturity transformation by narrow banks will be limited. 
But there exists a fundamental demand in the economy for maturity transformation. This has to 
be done somewhere in the financial system. To the extent that they finance by means of short-
term liabilities, the problem of bank runs will shift to these intermediaries. As , as the failure of 
Bear Stearns, AIG and Lehman Brothers in  the 2007-2008 crisis has shown, non-depository 
banks may also contribute to systemic risk.  
In addition, the financial intermediaries that extend risky loans to firms will have to finance 
these assets in some way. Other financial institutions will offer new financial instruments to 
consumers with higher interest rates, in return for more risk. Whether governments can commit 
not to guarantee these risk-seeking consumers is, however, questionable. If enough voters’ 
 
40 Nakamura (1994) finds informational economies of scope between deposit taking and loan insurance for small banks, but 
not for large banks. Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), using detailed contract information from nearly 18,000 bank loans to 
small Belgian firms, find that the scope of a relationship (which they define as the purchase of other information-sensitive 
products from a bank) decreases the loan's interest rate substantially.   64 
savings are at stake in times of crisis, this will create a strong incentive to extend some form of 
government guarantee.  Also, the current crisis has shown that keeping credit to firms flowing is 
an important reason for bailing-out the financial sector as a whole. If a large part of credit 
comes from banks other than narrow banks, governments will be reluctant to let such financial 
intermediaries fail. 
5.3.3  Transparency and standardization 
In the pre-crisis decade the number of Over-The-Counter (OTC) transactions has increased 
significantly. In a network of OTC contracts, total counterparty risk becomes hard to measure 
for the contracting parties themselves and even more so for other parties. This is especially the 
case because of so-called “daisy chains”: the exposure of A to B also depends on the exposure 
of B to C, which is unobservable for A.  
The current financial crisis has highlighted two aspects of the OTC market that deserve 
reform. The first aspect is that financial innovation typically occurs in such markets. The second 
aspect concerns the opacity of exposures in OTC contracts. Since such contracts are not 
exchange-traded or centrally cleared, neither regulators nor market participants have accurate 
knowledge of the full range of exposures and interconnections (NYU working group, 2009). As 
a result of this lack of transparency, regulators will find it more difficult to adequately monitor 
and control individual risk and aggregate risk. Centralized clearing improves transparency and 
insight into counterparty risk for both regulators and market participants. 
One option to address this issue is to require transactions to be cleared via a central clearing 
party (CCP). This way, settlement risk is transferred to the CCP. Note that this does not imply 
that OTC transactions have to be traded via the CCP derivates that are not traded through a 
clearinghouse may still be settled via a clearinghouse. Compared to bilateral relations, central 
clearing has the additional advantage that it allows for multilateral netting of positions. This 
reduces counterparty risk. The CCP, however, may now become systemically important. 
Although CCPs currently have a good track record at self-regulation (for instance via margin 
requirements), increased systemic relevance of these platforms may warrant closer regulatory 
scrutiny. 
Non-standard, customized OTC contracts are tuned to the needs of a specific customer and 
hence valuable. For non-standard, customized contracts mandatory clearing via the CCP is not 
very practical. Nevertheless, such contracts may add to systemic risk and in that case should be 
subject to regulatory scrutiny. One option may be to increase regulatory cost of transactions that 
are not carried out via a CCP, so financial institutions have an incentive to trade via the CCP. 
To further improve transparency, regulators can -in addition to central clearing- require banks to 
disclose their exposure to counterparty risks.  
Another potential route is to promote the standardization of financial products. There are 
social benefits to trading standardized and thus more liquid products. Margins can be set with 
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counterparty to better manage his risk (Tirole, 2009). As a result, the solvency of central 
clearing counterparties becomes more transparent. Such products may therefore be promoted, 
for instance via lower capital charges for standardized products compared to customized 
products. Of course, as a result non-standard OTC products will become more costly. 
5.3.4  Fair value accounting 
Fair value accounting (FVA) has important benefits. By marking assets to market, it forces 
banks to recognize their losses and deleverage. This has an important ex ante disciplinary effect. 
In addition, in the midst of a crisis the discretion of banks in making information available to 
the market may create additional systemic risk by increasing uncertainty about the quality of 
banks. Nevertheless, FVA also has drawbacks. If market prices do not reflect the value of an 
asset to the bank, FVA will under- or overestimate the actual net worth of a bank. Given that 
some banks had over 50% of their assets on their trading books (which according to FVA have 
to be marked-to-market), insolvency is hard to avoid when asset prices fall strongly (Panetta, et 
al, 2009).  
Should FVA therefore not be used when determining a bank’s regulatory capital? An 
important point is that the level of capital should not reflect a bank’s net worth under a going 
concern assumption, but its ability to withstand shocks and its ex ante risk taking incentives. If 
the market for certain assets is very illiquid, and a bank holds these assets on its balance sheet, 
this bank’s ability to withstand shocks will be eroded. Of course, the flip side of this is that an 
appreciation of assets that are illiquid even in normal times should not add to a banks regulatory 
capital.  
The central question seems therefore not to what extent FVA should be replaced with, for 
example HCA. If there is a difference at all from the viewpoint of a bank’s financiers, this is a 
question of how much markets should know about a bank’s health. Rather, the question is how 
changes in the market value of a bank’s assets translate into changes in a bank’s capital 
requirements. A possible solution would be to give regulators the option of weakening capital 
requirement when a crisis erupts by adjusting the capital requirements for assets held in the 
trading portfolio.  
A move away from FVA has several potential adverse effects. First, because markets will 
have less information on a bank’s health, it will increase the scope for regulators to postpone 
painful measures. Second, it will give banks more scope to artificially inflate earning by 
engaging in ‘gains trading’, i.e., selling assets that are undervalued by accounting measures and 
keeping those that are overvalued. 
5.3.5  Credit rating agencies 
Well functioning credit rating agencies facilitate market discipline. In addition, their ratings of 
assets banks have on their balance sheets play an important role in determining regulatory 
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intermediaries, creating information about the quality of products produced by issuers and 
providing this information to investors who buy these products. 
Credit rating agencies have been regulated in the US since 1973 when the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted rule 15c3-1, and created the so-called Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organization (NRSRO). Pension funds and banks often require 
that ratings data originate from an NRSRO. Following this rule, credit ratings have been 
incorporated into hundreds of rules, releases and regulations, in areas including securities, 
pensions, banking, real estate and insurance (Partnoy, 1999).  
Credit ratings agencies have evolved a remuneration model where the issuer of a particular 
security pays for the ratings it receives. This model may lead to a conflict of interests, which 
may negatively affect the quality of ratings in several ways. First, ratings may be biased upward 
because rating agencies inflate ratings. This may be easy if models are very complex and 
sensitive to small variations in input parameters, or if they allow a substantial amount of 
discretion. Second, the rating agencies may purposely choose coarse rating scales or not to 
publish rejected applications in order to facilitate ratings shopping. If an issuer doesn’t like the 
rating received by one rating agency, and the rating is not disclosed, it can turn to another rating 
agency. Credit rating agencies typically do not disclose ratings that displease issuers. 
One solution is to establish a government agency that supervises the internal checks and 
balances, independence and transparency of rating agencies. There should also be more 
emphasis on uniform rating, for example by penalizing agencies that perform worse than their 
peers or by dictating ratings methodologies. Another solution is that the supervisory authority 
that sets regulatory capital chooses a rating agency, either at random or according to expertise, 
to rate each asset. Removing issuers’ choice of rating agency diminishes the scope for ratings 
shopping and removes the incentive for agencies to attract business by offering favourable 
ratings. 
5.4  Ex post crisis intervention 
5.4.1  Lender of last resort 
The term lender of last resort (LLR) refers to a central bank’s liquidity facilities that are open to 
commercial banks. To resolve potential liquidity problems, Bagehot (1873) originally proposed 
that the central bank act as a lender of last resort by stating in advance its readiness to lend any 
amount (at a penalty rate) to a bank that is illiquid but has good collateral and is solvent. 
A solvent bank could in principle borrow from the market if it were able to credibly signal 
its solvency. Thus, in a normally functioning market, if a bank were unable to borrow through 
the market, this would signal that it is insolvent. A rationale for a LLR exists if money markets 
fail to allocate liquidity to solvent banks that need it, i.e., if market mechanisms cannot insure 
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We can distinguish three reasons why solvent banks may not be able to lend in the interbank 
market. First, there may be uncertainty in the market about the solvency of banks. There is a 
role for a LLR if regulators have more information than the market and lend to banks that the 
interbank market wrongly judges insolvent. Second, if one bank’s liquidity surplus is 
insufficient to lend to several banks it will not be able to diversify the risk of making a bad 
judgement. A LLR can lend to all illiquid borrowers and hence reap the benefits of 
diversification. Third, the interbank market may dry up due to a coordination failure between 
banks, or because the market for liquidity insurance is incomplete. (Freixas et al., 2002, Allen 
and Gale, 2000)  
Several questions pertaining to the optimal design of LLR facilities emerge. First, it is likely 
that emergency assistance is made against collateral that is not acceptable in normal monetary 
operations or on the interbank market (Calomiris, 2008). Therefore, emergency assistance may 
expose the central bank to credit risk due to the uncertainty of the value of the collateral taken. 
In practice, when an institution faces a sudden liquidity crisis, it is sometimes difficult for the 
central bank to obtain timely and detailed information to assess whether the institution is 
fundamentally solvent or not. A central bank may therefore also mistakenly lend to an insolvent 
bank. Moreover, what starts as an illiquidity problem can evolve into an insolvency problem. A 
bank which is solvent ex ante may not be so ex post; e.g. a future deterioration in the general 
economic situation may mean that a bank which was solvent at the time of the liquidity 
injection becomes insolvent later. Central banks which lend in such circumstances should have 
a clear exit strategy. 
Second, should lending be at a penalty rate? In practise, emergency lending to individual 
solvent institutions has sometimes been made without applying a premium over the current 
notional market rate (Goodhart and Schoenmaker, 1995). This divergence from Bagehot’s rules 
has several justifications: lending at a high rate may (i) aggravate the bank’s crisis; (ii) send a 
signal to the market that precipitates an untimely run, unless it is provided covertly; and (iii) 
give the managers incentives to pursue a higher risk/reward strategy to get themselves out of 
trouble (‘gamble for resurrection’). In practise, LLR lending is often used to bail-out banks. 
Such bail-out may be necessary to prevent a systemic crisis, but the possibility of a bail-out also 
introduces moral hazard. In addition, too much discretion for regulators in setting the terms of a 
liquidity injection may increase the scope for regulatory forbearance. 
5.4.2  Deposit Insurance 
The primary goal of deposit insurance is to prevent bank runs. A bank run occurs because 
depositors scramble for cash and all try to be first in line to ensure they get their money back. 
Due to deposit insurance the need to be first in line supposedly no longer exists. Deposit 
insurance used to be rare, but has become a widespread since the early seventies. Currently all 
OECD countries have deposit insurance, although this did not prevent the 2007-2008 financial 
crisis, so it seems. In many cases, systemic banks did not even have depositors.   68 
Several issues play a role in designing optimal deposit insurance schemes. First, there is an 
important debate whether deposit insurance actually improves stability. Exposure to losses 
carries an incentive to monitor and to police the risk-taking behaviour of banks and their 
government financial regulators. Mispriced guarantees introduce scope for cross-subsidisation 
and moral hazard. In an empirical study, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) conclude that 
explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability. The negative impact of 
deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger when the scheme is run by the 
government rather than by the private sector, and the more extensive the coverage offered to 
depositors is. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache argue that deposit insurance schemes involving 
the private sector in their day-to-day management control moral hazard and financial fragility 
more effectively. Private deposit insurance schemes, however, also have important drawbacks. 
In the end, only the government can bear the risk of a full-blown systemic crisis since it 
involves a simultaneous collapse of all banks. Thus, government guarantees need to back 
private insurance schemes, undermining these schemes incentives to price correctly. 
Second, a deposit insurance scheme may suffer from adverse selection. Requiring 
compulsory membership in the deposit insurance system for financial institutions increases the 
size of the insurance pool and prevents self-selection by low-risk institutions. The deposit 
insurance premium charged to banks should also reflect the risk that these banks will face a 
bank run. Such pricing may be difficult in the presence of asymmetric information.  
Market information could play a role in reducing the information asymmetry between 
regulators and regulated. Market participants, however, only have an incentive to gather 
information when they have something at stake. Deposit insurance schemes should therefore 
limits insurance of large depositors, subordinated debt-holders and other banks understand that 
their funds are at risk. It seems particularly appropriate to avoid insuring interbank deposits—
since such coverage would discourage banks from monitoring one another. Coinsurance and 
related private loss-sharing arrangements, such as subordinated debt and extended stockholder 
liability, sharpen these incentives. However, a particular deposit insurance mechanism should 
be credible. Frydl and Quintyn (2000) argue that limited deposit insurance schemes are 
inadequate to restore confidence. What is needed in such cases is the announcement of full 
protection for depositors and creditors. Such a guarantee aims to stabilise the banks’ funding 
and prevent or stop bank runs.  
Clearly, changing the deposit insurance scheme in the event of a crisis undermines the objective 
of reducing the incentive for moral hazard type behaviour in the future. Peria and Schmukler 
(2001) argue that deposit insurance schemes are never fully credible when either governments 
have reneged their promises in the past, if the deposit insurance scheme is under-capitalized, or 
if depositors are concerned about the cost of repayment (typically because of delays) through 
the deposit insurance fund.   69 
5.4.3  Prompt Corrective Action 
The US Federal Deposit Insurance Company Improvement Act introduced Prompt Corrective 
Action (PCA) in 1991. Under PCA, regulators’ mix of mandatory and discretionary actions 
depends on whether bank’s capital ratios cross certain thresholds. It aims to restrict banks’ risk 
taking by progressively penalizing banks as their capital ratios deteriorate and to mitigate 
regulatory forbearance, i.e., to prevent regulators from postponing painful interventions in the 
hope that problems will solve themselves. The motivation behind the law is to provide banks 
with incentives to address problems while they are still small enough to be manageable. 
The framework establishes a mix of mandatory and discretionary actions whenever a bank 
fails to maintain adequate capital. Examples include limits to dividend payments, restrictions to 
asset growth, restrictions to interaffiliate transactions, required authorisation to raise additional 
capital, and limits to credit for highly leveraged transactions. It sets out five categories of 
capital and mandates corrective action for banks in certain of the categories. Critically 
undercapitalised institutions, with a ratio of total capital assets below 2%, are required to be 
taken into receivership by the Federal Deposit Insurance Company. The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Company then resolves the bank so as to minimize its long-term losses or to 
minimize systemic risk. 
Although it might seem a good idea to restrict banks’ activities in this way, an obvious 
question is why ordinary capital adequacy regulation which does not restrict activities is 
insufficient. Freixas and Parigi (2000) argue that PCA improves upon capital regulation because 
agency problems due to moral hazard may differ among different classes of assets in a way 
uncorrelated with these assets’ risk. If this is the case, then capital regulation may cope with risk 
and adverse selection, but is unable to reduce moral hazard at the same time. 
Benston and Kaufman (1988) identify a number of advantages of PCA. First, it reduces the 
regulatory burden on well-capitalized institutions. Second, it mitigates the risk taking incentives 
embedded in deposit insurance schemes by increasing market discipline. Third, linking the 
regulatory response to an institution’s financial condition directly would reduce the scope for 
regulatory forbearance. Finally, forcing regulators to close an institution at the point of 
insolvency would reduce the cost to uninsured depositors and to the taxpayer. As prerequisites 
for successfully implementing a PCA policy Mayes et al. (2008) identify supervisory 
independence and accountability, accurate and timely information, and adequate resolution 
procedures.  
The sparse empirical work that tries to assess the impact of PCA on banks’ risk concludes that 
the introduction of PCA has raised capital ratios and reduced risk (Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001; 
Elizalde and Repullo, 2006). 
One issue with PCA is its scope. PCA in the US only focuses on commercial banks, while 
an important part of the problem of the current crisis lies within the investment banks and other 
non-bank institutions. It is therefore necessary to broaden the scope of prompt corrective action.    70 
Another issue is to find the appropriate levels of capital at which measures are intensified. The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Company Improvement Act specifies 10%, 8%, 6% and 2% as 
critical capital ratios. It is unclear why these levels are chosen and whether they are appropriate 
in practice. Presumably, different banks may contribute to systemic risk in different ways. For 
example, risk taking by big or heavily interconnected banks may contribute more to systemic 
risk. As a consequence, trigger levels should be more stringent for such institutions.  
Also, trigger levels should not be easy to manipulate. Risk adjusted capital ratios may 
therefore not be the most appropriate trigger mechanisms. Hart and Zingales (2009) suggest that 
large financial institutions maintain a capital cushion sufficiently great that their own credit 
default swap price stays below a threshold level. If this level is violated the regulator forces the 
large financial institutions to issue equity until the credit default swap price moves back below 
the threshold. 
Finally, the PCA approach may run into trouble when asset values change rapidly. In that 
case, there is no gradual increase of regulatory intervention. The speed of the deterioration can 
interfere with the carefully planned procedure that regulators have devised to prevent 
insolvency or provide for an orderly dissolution. Regulators may not be able to prevent 
creditors to write contracts that allow them to withdraw early when a bank is sufficiently 
distressed. 
5.4.4  Living will 
To credibly allow banks to fail, governments have to ensure that the liquidation of the bank will 
not have too many negative spillover effects. One way to ensure this is to require banks to make 
plans to resolve themselves in a short period of time, the so-called “living will”. Such plans 
would also give banks an incentive to keep their structure simple (Rajan, 2009). To set up a 
living will, a bank has to make an inventory of its capital structure, guarantees provided and the 
valuation of their portfolio. This living will should be made from the perspective of a sudden 
liquidation. 
However, there are some problems with designing a living will. First, the lack of uniformity. 
There is no consensus on the rules for setting up a living will. The issues included in the living 
will should be based on objective methods of measurement. At the same time, to keep the living 
will up-to-date will be costly, especially for reporting the value of illiquid assets. Also there is a 
problem that the living will itself will be to complex if more and more issues are included. 
Another problem according to the NYU working group (2009) is the identification and timing 
of a trigger variable. The purpose of a living will is to provide a swift rescue and to try to fulfil 
the obligatory payments as much as possible. However, if the identification variable reacts too 
late, the bank will be unable to fulfil any obligation.   71 
5.4.5  Bank-specific bankruptcy law  
In some countries, such as US, Canada, or Japan, banks are subject to special insolvency 
regimes that differ considerably from those applicable to other companies.
41 These jurisdictions 
confer considerable powers on administrative and regulatory agencies to deal with bank 
failures. Yet in other jurisdictions, such as most European countries, bank insolvency is treated 
no different from ordinary bankruptcy.
42 
From an economic point of view, bankruptcy laws for normal firms exist because the 
contracts that debtors can write are incomplete.
43 Thus in the case of expected bankruptcy, each 
individual debtor cannot do better than try to be the first to recover his debts, for example by 
seizing a firm’s assets. This may lead to an inefficient dismantlement of a firm (Hart, 2000). 
In the case of banks, the potential externalities from a bank’s bankruptcy that are described 
in section 3 and section 4 are an important reason why a special bankruptcy regime should 
apply to banks. Such a regime should not only account for the inefficiencies individual 
claimants inflict on each other, but also for the inefficiencies they inflict on non claimants such 
as other banks and, ultimately, the taxpayer.  
One example of such a bank-tailored bankruptcy law is the FDIC Improvement Act in the 
US, which increased the powers of the FDIC and the Fed by expanding their authority as a 
federal and primary regulator. They have the possibility to close a bank and appoint the FDIC 
as its statutory receiver. Before closing a bank most times it runs as a bridge bank which means 
that the bank still operates while the final disposition is being worked out. This bridge bank is 
owned and operated by the FDIC. 
Some pitfalls in developing special bankruptcy laws for bank exist. The first issue is related 
to jurisdiction. As banks operate across different legal jurisdictions, the insolvency process 
itself creates a coordination problem across the courts in different countries. Jurisdictions may 
differ in several aspects.  
First, legal approaches to bankruptcy resolution may be either pro-creditor or pro-debtor.
44 The 
distinction matters when bi-directional transactions between counter parties have to be settled. 
In payment systems, for example, banks send each other funds to settle thousands of 
transactions throughout the day. Whereas the gross positions are large, the net positions are 
 
41 According to Sheila Bair, in the US “the current bankruptcy framework available to resolve large, complex non-bank 
financial entities and financial holding companies was not designed to protect the stability of the financial system. (…) the 
FDIC has the authority to take control of only the failing bank subsidiary, thereby protecting the insured depositors.” 
Statement of Sheila C. Bair Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on Regulating and Resolving Institutions 
Considered “Too Big To Fail” before the committee on banking, housing and urban affairs of the US senate. 
42 The UK has recently introduced a separate bankruptcy regime for banks.  
43 According to Hart, 2000, economists do not yet have a satisfactory theory as to why contracts are incomplete. 
44 Pro-creditor bankruptcy laws recognize the right of creditors to protect themselves against default through ex ante 
contractual agreements that permit the solvent counterparty to close out contracts and set off obligations. The pro debtor 
approach, seeks to maximize the value of the bankrupt bank by affirming claims due to the bankrupt firm and disavowing 
claims made on the firm. This approach often ignores ex ante contractual arrangements that would favour one creditor over 
another (Bliss, 2003).   72 
relatively modest. Clearing payments in the case of the resolution of an insolvent bank can be 
done by using a close-out netting agreement. In general, close-out netting involves the 
termination of all contracts between the insolvent and a solvent counterparty (Bliss, 2003). 
Another issue is the treatment of branches. Jurisdictions may also differ in how they treat 
branches. Branches of foreign banks will then be treated as separate legal entities. In a separate 
entity approach, the various branches of the bank located in different jurisdictions will be dealt 
with in separate legal proceedings. In contrast, when the single entity approach is adopted there 
will be only one of set insolvency proceedings in which the bank is treated as a whole. Such 
differences may lead to potentially adversarial competition among jurisdictions each seeking to 
maximize the value of assets available to their own creditors (Bliss, 2003). Coordination 
between jurisdictions may alleviate this problem.  
 To credibly allow banks to fail governments have to ensure that the liquidation of the bank 
will not have too much negative spill over effects. One way to ensure this is to require banks to 
make plans to resolve themselves in a short period of time, the so-called “living will”. Such 
plans would also give banks an incentive to keep their structure simple (Rajan, 2009).   73 
6  Conclusions 
The 2007-2008 financial crisis has put systemic risk at the centre of the academic and policy 
debates. It is therefore important to make the notion of systemic risk in financial markets more 
precise. Systemic risk refers to the probability that a systemic crisis arises. This probability 
depends largely on the externalities from banks’ risk taking. These externalities exist because 
several mechanisms propagate and amplify the effects of a shock to the financial system to the 
extent that it can no longer efficiently perform its intermediary function. 
We identify two amplification mechanisms that create externalities from individual banks’ 
risk taking decisions: contagion within the financial sector and the pro-cyclical connection 
between the financial sector and the real economy. The basic mechanisms for contagion are 
interconnectedness, the potential for informational spillovers, and liquidity-freezes. The basic 
mechanisms for pro-cyclical connections are imperfect regulation, credit rationing, and herding. 
Regulation can try to diminish systemic risk by forcing banks to internalise the external 
effects of their risk taking, or seek to dampen propagation mechanisms. Alternatively, 
regulation may try to reduce the probability that an individual bank fails. Government 
regulation of financial intermediation takes the form of banking supervision, deposit insurance, 
capital requirements, lender of last resort facilities and bank crisis resolution regime. Although 
some of these measures reduce externalities (for example lender of last resort) or dampen 
propagation mechanisms (for example deposit insurance), regulation has traditionally focussed 
on reducing the probability that an individual bank fails by imposing adequate capital 
requirements. It is, however, now widely recognized that regulation should instead focus more 
on systemic issues. Unfortunately, four generic problems interfere with effective regulation of 
systemic risk. 
In view of these generic problems, policies that try to reduce systemic risk should meet 
several requirements. First, they should give financial intermediaries the incentive to reduce 
systemic risk. Second, they should give regulators sufficient incentives to intervene and reduce 
governments’ time-inconsistency problem. Third, they should not depend on complex 
information, but instead be easy to enforce and difficult to manipulate. Finally, they should 
increase market discipline. 
Strengthening market discipline and making optimal use of information generated by 
markets are the best way to overcome the measurement problem, prevent regulatory gaming, 
reduce the scope for regulatory forbearance, and address governments’ time-inconsistency 
problem. Policy measures that contribute to this goal include prompt corrective action, a bank-
specific bankruptcy regime, a living will, and isolating crucial parts of the financial system. 
This, however, requires that at least some financiers have something at stake when they lend 
their money to a bank. With some probability they should loose their money. 
It should therefore be credible for the government to allow a bank to go bankrupt. Several 
policy measures contribute to this goal including prompt corrective action, bank-specific   74 
bankruptcy regime, living will, and isolating crucial parts of the financial system. For example, 
the payments system should be designed in such a way that it is able to function, despite the 
bankruptcy of one of its users. Decoupling this crucial public utility function from banks would 
reduce spillovers from a bank failure to the real economy and help the government in 
committing not to bail out financial intermediaries when they go bankrupt. 
Finally, we should realise, however, that systemic risk is inherent in the functions of banks: 
reducing moral hazard by monitoring borrowers, smoothing the idiosyncratic liquidity needs of 
consumers and firms and facilitating payments. The interconnectedness of banks is driven by 
banks’ desire to insure against unexpected liquidity shocks and the opportunities for 
diversification offered by idiosyncratic risks. Banks’ fragile funding structure results from the 
illiquidity of their assets and funding through demandable deposits and short-term loans. 
Procyclicality results from the agency costs that tie the amount of collateral firms’ can generate 
to the amount they can borrow. It is both impossible and undesirable to fully eliminate systemic 
risk.   75 
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